Wojciech Rzepiński
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland
English abstract: The article examines the way in which the Polish Constitutional Tribunal operates, which involves replacing its own process of interpreting the provisions under review by accepting the interpretation of another court. The objective of the article is to provide a theoretical account of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’s conduct to the readers. Therefore, the concepts developed at the Poznan School of Theory of Law are used, namely the distinction between a provision of the law and a legal norm, as well as a distinction between pragmatic and nonpragmatic interpretation. The role of the metatheory used to analyse the Tribunal’s conduct is also played by Robert B. Brandom’s analytic pragmatism. Analytic pragmatism allows the conclusion to be drawn that, through its activity, the Tribunal indicates 1) what an agent must do (within the legal practice) for the vocabulary of normative acts to mean something (PV-sufficiency), and 2) what vocabulary is sufficient to define those practices (VP-sufficiency). The practice of applying the law can be described with the use of the TOTE concept (Test-Operation-Test-Exit). In this case TOTE cycles are open-ended. Therefore, in its further practice, the Tribunal might indicate further practices-or-abilities which are sufficient for the vocabulary of normative acts to mean something.
Keywords: judicial practice, Constitutional Tribunal, analytic pragmatism, provision of the law, legal norm, application of the law
Language: English
Published: Number 2(35)/2023, pp. 65-76.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280//AFPiFS.2023.2.65
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