Research article

May fashionable and just have something in common? – or a few words about „thick terms”, „thick concepts” and „thick properties”

Article authors
  1. Izabela Skoczeń

Czy modny i sprawiedliwy mogą mieć ze sobą coś wspólnego? – czyli kilka słów o thick terms, thick concepts oraz thick properties

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(12)/2016, s. 55-63

English

Abstract

In the present article I explore two questions. First, what are the theoretical relations between thick terms, concepts and properties? I try to depict that the answer is dependent upon a choice of philosophical assumptions. Second, I explore what are the possible bonds between descriptive and evaluative components of thick expressions. I concentrate on the nature of the evaluative component and contrast the semantic and pragmatic approaches. Finally, I conclude that terms such as ‘legal’ are par excellence thick. Therefore, we should be aware of all the theoretical intricacies of the evaluative content when building a coherent theory of the legal realm.

Keywords

  • thick terms
  • thick concepts
  • thick properties
  • legal philosophy
  • law and language
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References

14 reference entries

References

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Publication information

Author and affiliation

Izabela Skoczeń

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Issue data

Issue nr 1(12)/2016

Pages
55-63
Published
AccessOtwarty LicenceCC BY 4.0 ↗

How to cite

Bibliographic description and verified export formats.

Format AFPiFS

I. Skoczeń, May fashionable and just have something in common? – or a few words about „thick terms”, „thick concepts” and „thick properties”, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(12)/2016, s. 55–63, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2016.1.55