Reconstruction of the Concept of Interpretative Juristic Presumption

Keywords: legal presumption, juristic presumption, interpretative juristic presumption, legal interpretation

English abstract: Juridical presumptions, including interpretative juridical presumptions, have not been elaborated on in detail in theoretical and legal terms, although they are an interpretative tool often used in jurisdiction and literature. Recently there has been a revival of the discussion on the presumption of constitutionality (conformity with the constitution) of laws (statutes). Another example of an interpretative juridical presumption is the presumption of rationality of the legislator, based on the assumption of rationality of the legislator elaborated in the 1970s by Leszek Nowak and Jerzy Wróblewski. A comparative analysis of interpretative juridical presumptions with institutions such as legal presumptions and legal fictions allows to reconstruct the most important features of the former in terms of their structure and functions, and this in turn will allow to claim that interpretative juridical presumptions are directly referred to by the authorities applying the law in difficult cases in which it is impossible to complete the interpretation process without taking into account the basic values of the legal system, not directly expressed in this system or only sketched at the level of constitutional standards. Due to the special role that interpretative juridical presumptions play in the process of interpretation, their law-making function may be also discussed.

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