Joseph Raz

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: Joseph Raz, perfectionist liberalism, personal autonomy, group rights as a category, political conception of human rights, Ronald Dworkin, ethical monism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 42-57.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.42

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Number of downloads: 90

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University, Kraków

English abstract: One of the most eminent contemporary legal philosophers, Joseph Raz, made significant contributions not only to the aforementioned discipline, but also to political philosophy and moral philosophy, the three branches of which, in his view, contribute to practical philosophy. J. Raz’s achievements in the latter two areas are less familiar to the Polish reader than his concepts in the field of jurisprudence, all the more so because none of his works, which are part of the aforementioned, more general fields, has been translated into Polish. The present essay is devoted to the key threads of the thinker’s inquiries in the field of moral philosophy. The reconstruction made of J. Raz’s views takes into account the following ideas: his original version of ethical pluralism, the concept of constitutive incommensurability, a specific understanding of the universality of values, the thesis of their social dependence and the concepts of personal sense and personal attachment. The interpretation of the Oxford philosopher’s reflections is enriched by two digressions, referring in turn – to Charles Taylor’s critique of the instrumental way of life and to Ronald Dworkin’s underlying jurisprudence of ethical monism. This is because arguments can be derived from the reflections of the protagonist of the essay, which call into question the theses of the two aforementioned thinkers.

The presentation and analysis of the key themes of J. Raz’s moral philosophy is complemented by the author’s reminiscences of her meetings and conversations with the Oxford scholar.

Key words: Joseph Raz, ethical pluralism, constitutive incommensurability, social dependence thesis, personal meaning, personal attachment, universality of values.

Language: Polish

Published: no. 1(42)/2025, pp. 60-76.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.60

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Number of downloads: 144

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.