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Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Types of Judicial Review Tests and the Principle of Proportionality

Prof. UMK dr hab. Milena Korycka-Zirk

Mikołaj Kopernik University in Toruń

English abstract: Judicial review in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court can take the form of one of three formulas for examining an act or action of an authority (strict scrutiny test, intermediate scrutiny test, or rational basis test). In the context of the constitutional review each of these tests requires an analysis, of three essential aspects: what kind of individual interest is limited, what form of public interest legitimation is required, and how the means and the purpose so indicated are related. A detailed analysis of these standards of proportion, jurisprudentially developed and evolutionarily tightened, in confrontation with the principle of proportionality used in European constitutions (and documents on international protection of human rights) allows to formulate theses about which standard is stronger, which one creates a barrier providing better protection of individual autonomy, and which is more resistant to ‘steps backwards’ in this respect.

Keywords: judicial review (of constitutionality of statutes), principle of proportionality, strict scrutiny test, intermediate scrutiny test, rational basis test

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(31)/2022, pp. 54-69.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.2.54

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This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: intermediate scrutiny test, judicial review (of constitutionality of statutes), principle of proportionality, rational basis test, strict scrutiny test

Robert Alexy’s Theory of Legal Principles

Dr Milena Korycka

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń


English abstract:
This article concerns Robert Alexy’s conception of legal principles, which conception he builds on the basis of an analysis of constitutional norms. The main assumption of his conception of rights is that in this field it is necessary to use the theory of principles as the basis. He created his own theory of principles as norms which require realization to the greatest extent possible in the light of legal and actual possibilities. Consequently, he defines principles as optimisation commands, capable of different degrees of realization depending on the actual and legal possibilities. The dimension of the legal possibility depends on the contrasting principles and rules. R. Alexy treats rules and principles as reasons of different kinds. While principles are always prima facie reasons, rules are definitive reasons until an exception to them is provided for. R. Alexy claims also that the nature of principles implies the existence of the principle of proportionality in the sense that the principle of proportionality with its three “sub-principles”: adequacy, necessity and proportionality in the strict sense, logically follows from the nature of principles and can be inferred from them

Keywords: Robert Alexy, legal principles, principle of proportionality
(keywords supplied by the editors)

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 48-63.

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References:

  1. Alexy R., A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford-New York 2002.
  2. Alexy R., Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality, „Ratio Juris” 2003/2.
  3. Alexy R., Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Legal Discourse, ”Cardozo Law Review” 1995–1996/17.
  4. Alexy R., On the Structure of Legal Principles, ”Ratio Juris” 2000/3.
  5. Alexy R., On the Thesis of a Necessary Connection Between Law and Morality: Bulygin’s Critique, „Ratio Juris” 2000/2.
  6. Alexy R., The argument from justice. A reply to legal positivism, Oxford 2002.
  7. Alexy R., The Nature of Legal Philosophy, „Ratio Juris” 2004/2.
  8. Alexy R., W obronie niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1993/11.
  9. Dworkin R., The Model of Rules, ”The University of Chicago Law Review” 1967-68/35.
  10. Dworkin R., Imperium Prawa, Warszawa 2006.
  11. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Zasady i reguły prawne, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
  12. Habermas J., Between facts and norms, Cambridge 1996.
  13. Hart H.L.A., Pojęcie prawa, Warszawa 1998.
  14. Klatt M., Taking rights less seriously. A structural analysis of judicial discretion, „Ratio Juris” 2007/2.
  15. Korycka M., Zasada proporcjonalności – refleksje na gruncie aksjologicznych podstaw konstytucji z 1997 roku i orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego, w: Morawski L. (red.), Wykładnia prawa i inne problemy filozofii prawa, Toruń 2005.
  16. Korycka M., Zasady prawa, „Jurysta” 2007/8.
  17. Morawski L. (red.), Wykładnia prawa i inne problemy filozofii prawa, Toruń 2005.
  18. Płeszka K., Reguły preferencji w prawniczych rozumowaniach interpretacyjnych, w: Stelmach J. (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2003.
  19. Raz J., Autorytet prawa, Warszawa 2000.
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  22. Tuleja P., Normatywna treść praw jednostki w ustawach konstytucyjnych RP, Warszawa 1997.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: legal principles, Milena Korycka, principle of proportionality, Robert Alexy

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

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