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May fashionable and just have something in common? – or a few words about „thick terms”, „thick concepts” and „thick properties”

Mgr Izabela Skoczeń

Jagiellonian University in Kraków


Abstract:
In the present article I explore two questions. First, what are the theoretical relations between thick terms, concepts and properties? I try to depict that the answer is dependent upon a choice of philosophical assumptions. Second, I explore what are the possible bonds between descriptive and evaluative components of thick expressions. I concentrate on the nature of the evaluative component and contrast the semantic and pragmatic approaches. Finally, I conclude that terms such as ‘legal’ are par excellence thick. Therefore, we should be aware of all the theoretical intricacies of the evaluative content when building a coherent theory of the legal realm.

Keywords: thick terms, thick concepts, thick properties, legal philosophy, law and language

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 55-63.

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Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Izabela Skoczeń, law and language, legal philosophy, thick concepts, thick properties, thick terms

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