Research article
Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept?
Czy pojęcie prawa jest pojęciem z istoty spornym?
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 1(6)/2013, s. 54-67
English
Abstract
Some legal thinkers (R. Dworkin amongst them) suppose that the concept of law is an essentially contested concept. This article firstly introduces the idea of essentially contested concepts, developed by W.B. Gallie. Secondly, it is argued that the concept of law cannot be perceived as an essentially contested concept, though some related concepts (such as “the rule of law”, according to J. Waldron’s analysis) can. Finally, I propose some arguments, in which I partly follow K. Ehrenberg’s recent analysis, showing that in Dworkinean terms, calling law an essentially contested concept may raise doubts and controversy.
Keywords
- contestation
- concept
- conception
- essentially contested concepts
References
25 reference entries
References
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Publication information
Issue data
Issue nr 1(6)/2013
- Pages
- 54-67
- Published
How to cite
Bibliographic description and verified export formats.
Format AFPiFS
A. Dyrda, Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept?, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 1(6)/2013, s. 54–67, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54
ACM
[1] Adam Dyrda. 2013. Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept? AFPiFS 1(6) (2013), 54–67. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54
ACS
(1) Dyrda, A. Is the Concept of Law an Essentially Contested Concept? AFPiFS 2013, No. 1(6), 54–67. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
APA
Dyrda, A. (2013). Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept? Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(6), 54–67. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54
ABNT
DYRDA, Adam. Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept? Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, n. 1(6), p. 54–67, 2013.
Chicago
Dyrda, Adam. “Is the Concept of Law an Essentially Contested Concept?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6) (2013): 54–67. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
Harvard
Dyrda, A. (2013) “Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept?,” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 1(6), pp. 54–67. Available at: https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
IEEE
[1] A. Dyrda, “Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept?,” AFPiFS, no. 1(6), pp. 54–67, 2013, doi: 10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
MLA
Dyrda, Adam. “Is the Concept of Law an Essentially Contested Concept?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6), 2013, pp. 54–67, https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
Turabian
Dyrda, Adam. “Is the Concept of Law an Essentially Contested Concept?” Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, no. 1(6) (2013): 54–67. https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54.
Vancouver
1. Dyrda A. Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept? AFPiFS. 2013;1(6):54–67. doi:10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54
OSCOLA
Adam Dyrda, ‘Is the concept of law an essentially contested concept?’ (2013) 1(6) AFPiFS 54 <https://doi.org/10.36280/afpifs.2013.1.54>.