Archiwum Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej Journal of the Polish Section of IVR ISSN 2082-3304 Logo Polskiej Sekcji IVR Polska Sekcja IVR ↗

Artykuł naukowy

The Model of Precedent Based upon Analogical Reasoning

Article authors
  1. Maciej Koszowski

Model precedensu z analogii

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, nr 2(9)/2014, s. 43-65

DOI 10.36280/afpifs.2014.2.43 ↗
Issue
nr 2(9)/2014
Pages
43-65
Published
Article language
English

Polish

Translated abstract

Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.

Translated keywords

  • precedens sądowy
  • analogia
  • faktualny model analogii
  • model racjonalny analogii

English

Abstract

Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.

Keywords

  • judicial precedent
  • analogical reasoning
  • factual model
  • rational model
Full text PDF How to cite

References

44 reference entries

References

  1. Aldisert, R.J. (1997). Logic for Lawyers. A Guide to Cl ear Legal Thinking. South Bend: National

  2. Institute for Trial Advocacy.

  3. Alexander, L., Sherwin, E. (2008). Demystifying Legal Reasoning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  4. Bankowski, Z. (1991). Analogical Reasoning and Legal Institutions. In P. Nerhot ( Ed.), Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Fragments of Legal Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Linguistics. Dordrecht: Springer Science.

  5. Braman, E. (2009). Law, Politics & Perception. How Policy Preferences Influence Legal Reasoning. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

  6. Brewer, S. (1996). Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy. Harvard Law Review 109/5, 923–1028.

  7. Brożek, B. (200 7). Rationality and Discourse. Towards a Normative Model of Applying Law. Warszawa: Wolters Kluwer.

  8. Burton, S.J. (2007). An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning. Austin: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business.

  9. Chamberlain, D.H. (1885). The doctrine of stare decisis: its reasons and its extent. New York: New York State Bar Association.

  10. Christie, G.C. (1982). Law, Norms & Authority. London: Duckworth.

  11. Cross, R. (1968). Precedent in English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  12. Duxbury, N. (2008). The Nature and Authority of Precedent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  13. Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Duckworth.

  14. Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious. American Psychologist, 709–724.

  15. Fowler, T. (1895). The Elements of Deductive Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  16. Fried, C. (1982). Observation. The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, „Texas Law Review” 1981–1982/60

  17. Gilovich, T., Griffin, D.W., Kahneman D. (2002). (Ed.) Heuristics and Biases. The Psychology of Intuitive Judgement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  18. Gladwell, M. (2005). Blink. The Power of Thinking without Thinking. London: Brettenham House.

  19. Golding, M.P. (2001). Legal Reasoning. Toronto: Ontario Broadview Press.

  20. Goodhart, A.L. (1930). Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case. Yale Law Journal 40/2, 161–183.

  21. Holyoak, K.J., Thagard, P. (1996). Mental Leaps. Analogy in Creative Thought. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press.

  22. Huhn, W. (2008). The Five Types of Legal Argument. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.

  23. Hunter, D. (2004). Teaching and Using Analogy in Law. Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors 2, 151–168.

  24. Hutcheson, J.C. (1998). The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the „Hunch” in Judicial Decision. South Texas Law Review 39/4, 889–904.

  25. Koszowski, M. (2009). Anglosaska doktryna precedensu. Porównanie z polską praktyką orzeczniczą. Warszawa: Warszawska Firma Wydawnicza.

  26. Koszowski, M. (2013). Bezpieczeństwo a pewność prawa: dwie metody stosowania prawa w ramach Unii Europejskiej. In S.M. Grochalski ( Ed.), Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w prawnym wymiarze Unii Europejskiej. Dąbrowa Górnicza: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Biznesu.

  27. Koszowski, M. (2013). O lukach w prawie rzadko spotykanych słów kilka. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej 6/1, 109–122.

  28. Levi, E.H. (1949). An Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

  29. Llewellyn, K.N. (2008). The Bramble Bush. The Classic Lectures on the Law and Law School. With a New Introduction and Notes by Steve Sheppard. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  30. MacCormick, D.N. (1978). Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  31. MacCormick, D.N. (2005). Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. A Theory of Legal Reasoning. Oxf ord: Oxford University Press.

  32. Maris, C.W. (1991). Milking the Meter – On Analogy, Universalizability and World Views. In P. Nerhot (Ed.), Legal Knowledge and Analogy. Fragments of Legal Epistemology, Hermeneutics and Linguistics (pp. 71–106). Dordrecht: Springer Science.

  33. Morawski, L., Zirk-Sadowski, M. (1997). Precedent in Poland. In D.N. MacCormick, R.S. Summers (Eds.), Interpreting Precedents. A Comparative Study (pp. 219–258). London: Routledge.

  34. Peczenik, A. (2008). On Law and Reason. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

  35. Plessner, H., Betsch, C., Betsch, T. (Ed.) Intuition in Judgment and Decision Making. Mahwah: Routledge.

  36. Raz, J. (1979). The Authority of Law. Essays on Law and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  37. Schauer, F. (1991). Playing by the Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule -Based Decision - Making in Law and in Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  38. Schauer, F. (2009). Thinking Like a Lawyer. A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press.

  39. Sinclair, M. (2011). (Ed.) Handbook of Intuition Research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

  40. Spellman, B.A. (2004). Reflections of a Recovering Lawyer: How Becoming a Cognitive Psychologist – and (in Particular) Studying Analogical and Casual Reasoning – Changed my Views about the Field of Psychology and Law. Chicago-Kent Law Review 79/3, 1187–1214.

  41. Sunstein, C.R. (1993). Commentary on Analogical Reasoning. Harvard Law Review 106/3, 741–791.

  42. Sunstein, C.R. (1996). Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  43. Weinreb, L.L. (2005). Legal Reason. The Use of Analogy in Legal Argumen t. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  44. White, J. (1996). Analogical reasoning. In D. Patterson (Ed.), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Publication information

Author and affiliation

Maciej Koszowski

Politechnika Śląska

Issue data

Issue nr 2(9)/2014

Pages
43-65
Published
AccessOtwarty LicenceCC BY 4.0 ↗

How to cite

Bibliographic description and verified export formats.

Format AFPiFS

M. Koszowski, The Model of Precedent Based upon Analogical Reasoning, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” nr 2(9)/2014, s. 43–65, DOI: 10.36280/afpifs.2014.2.43

Export citation data