Metaphysical realism in the face of challenges from contextualism and nonfactualism – considerations against the background of Michael Moore’s natural law theory

References

1. 01

   Bezuidenhout, A. (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives 16, 105-134.

2. 02

   Bix, B. (1992). Michael Moore’s Realist Approach to Law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, 1293–1331.

3. 03

   Brink, D.O. (1988). Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review. Philosophy & Public Affairs 17(2), 105–148.

4. 04

   Brink, D.O. (1989). Semantics and Legal Interpretation (Further Thoughts). The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2, 181–191.

5. 05

   Cappelen, H., Lepore, E. (2005). Insensitive Semantics. A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

6. 06

   Clapp, L. (2012). Three Challenges for Indexicalism. Mind & Language 27(4), 435-465.

7. 07

   Cohen, S. (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons. Philosophical Perspectives 13, 57-89.

8. 08

   Dziobkowski, B. (2016). Nonfaktualizm. In: J. Hołówka, B. Dziobkowski ( Eds.), Panorama współczesnej filozofii. Warszawa: PWN.

9. 09

   Frege, G. (2014). Sens i znaczenie. In: G. Frege, Pisma semantyczne. Warszawa: PWN.

10. 10

    Kripke, S. (2007). Wittgenstein o regułach i języku prywatnym. Wykład wprowadzający. Warszawa: Aletheia.

11. 11

    Mackie, J.L. (1990). Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin Books.

12. 12

    McGinn, C. (2002), Wittgenstein, Kripke and Non -reductionism about Meaning. In: A. Miller, C. Wright (Eds.), Rule-following and Meaning. Montreal–Kingston: Taylor & Francis.

13. 13

    Moore, M. (1985). A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation. Southern California Law Review 58, 277-398.

14. 14

    Moore, M. (1989). The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse? Stanford Law Review 41(4), 871-957.

15. 15

    Moore, M. (2004). Moral Reality. In: M. Moore, Objectivity in Ethics and Law. Cambridge: Ashgate.

16. 16

    Moore, M. (2004). Moral Reality Revisited. In: M. Moore, Objectivity in Ethics and Law. Cambridge: Ashgate.

17. 17

    Munzer, S. (1985). Realistic Limits on Realist Interpretation. Southern California Law Review 68, 459–475.

18. 18

    Patterson, D. (1989). Realist Semantics and Legal Theory. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2, 175–179.

19. 19

    Odrowąż–Sypniewska, J. (2013). Debata między minimalizmem semantycznym a kontekstualizmem. In: P. Stalmaszczyk (Ed.), Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju. Łódź: Primum Verbum.

20. 20

    Odrowąż–Sypniewska, J. (2013). Kontekstualizm i wyrażenia nieostre. Warszawa: Semper Publishers.

21. 21

    Patterson, D. (1989). What Was Realism?: A Reply to David Brink. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 2, 193–195.

22. 22

    Quine, W.V.O. (2000). O tym, co istnieje. In: W.V.O. Quine, Z punktu widzenia logiki. Warszawa: Aletheia.

23. 23

    Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

24. 24

    Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of Mind. Cambridge (Mass.)-London: MIT Press.

25. 25

    Skoczeń, I. (2016). Minimal Semantics and Legal Interpretation. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 3, 615–633.

26. 26

    Stavropoulos, N. (1996). Objectivity in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

27. 27

    Travis, C. (1997). Pragmatics. In: B. Hale, C. Wright ( Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

28. 28

    Wacks, R. (2009). Understanding Jurisprudence. An Introduction to Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

29. 29

    Wittgenstein, L. (2000). Dociekania filozoficzne. Warszawa: PWN.