Dr Michał Pełka

University of Warsaw

English abstract The article tackles with the problem of truth-conditional theory of meaning for sentences, which are usually connected with the doctrine of metaphysical realism. It consists basically of two parts. The first part describes several arguments aimed at rejecting realism. The conclusion of this part is a claim that even if Moore’s defense in this regard is successful there are two additional attempts to undermine his theory, namely the argument from contextualism and the argument from nonfactualism that are described and developed in the second part of the paper.

Keywords: contextualism, Saul Kripke, metaphysical realism, Michael Moore, nonfactualism, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Language: Polish

Received: 25.10.2016
Accepted: 08.02.2017

Published: Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 74-89.

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