intentionalism

Intentional Character of the Interpretation of the Holy Scripture and the Interpretation of Law

Mgr Paweł T. SKOCZYKŁODA

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The article aims to compare the process of interpreting law with that of interpreting the Holy Scripture. The study focuses on the issue of the interpretative approach adopted for interpretation in both above-mentioned branches of study. An appropriate interpretative approach determines the meaning of the text, which presupposes its correct interpretation. As part of the study, an analysis is undertaken of the interpretative assumptions, expounded in legal scholarship, which assumptions underlie the process of legal interpretation. The concept of interpretation of the sacred text that is recognized in biblical hermeneutics is presented. It turns out that despite the fact that law and the Bible are obviously different from each other, both legal theory and biblical hermeneutics were developed and largely based on the same concept of interpretation – intentionalism – identifying the meaning of utterances with meaning intended by the author of the statement. The conducted analysis enables formulating a general conclusion that only intentionalism makes it possible to discover the full and proper sense of the analyzed utterance.

Keywords: interpretation, statutory interpretation, exegesis, Holy Scripture, intentionalism, textualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 98-110

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.98

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On the Different Understanding of the Legislative Intent in the Anglo-Saxon Discourse. Analysis of the Views of Stanley Fish, Larry Alexander, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Richard Ekins, and Victoria Nourse

Mgr Paweł A. BOIKE

“Rerum Socialium” Interdisciplinary Doctoral School of Social Sciences,
Nicolaus Copernicus University in Torun

English abstract: The intention of the legislature, as a constitutive concept for intentionalism, is understood very differently by representatives of this trend and not only by them. The aim of this study is to familiarize the Polish reader with how intentions are understood by five authors: Stanley Fish, Larry Alexander, Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Richard Ekins, and Victoria Nourse, as well as to conduct a comparative analysis of their views. This involves the use of a theoretical method consisting in the description of concepts and an attempt to compare them. In the light of the findings, it should be emphasized that Victoria Nourse’s views are more in line with the assumptions of purposivism than intentionalism. Stanley Fish and Larry Alexander represent a radical variety of intentionalism, on whose basis, due to radical ontological assumptions, it is not possible to build any methods of interpretation capable of practical application. Not so with Jeffrey Goldsworthy and Richard Ekins, who assume that the legislature acts in accordance with “simple common sense”.

Keywords: interpretation, intention, intentionalism, purposivism, originalism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(37)/2023, pp. 15-26.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.4.15

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Against a local theory of meaning for the legal language – some general remarks

Mgr Paweł Banaś

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Within philosophy of law as well as philosophy of language one can find a view suggesting that legal and natural languages have two different theories of meaning: meaning externalism and intentionalism accordingly. This view can be interpreted as a metaphysical one, ie. that there are two different kinds of facts that determine that expressions of legal and natural languages mean whatever they mean. For natural language these facts would be intentions of the speaker. Such a view of natural language seem intuitive as the aim of a communication is usually trying to grasp whatever a speaker has in mind. Such a view proves, however, problematic for the legal language. Meaning exteralism for legal language, on the other hand, allows for law to be objective. But it must show how its expressions are meaningful (as content is usually closely related to intentionality). As a result, a satisfactory theory of facts constituting linguistic meaning might require a pressuposition that meaning (also legal or natural) is a social artifact: its content is constituted by some kind of collective intentionality of language users. This solves a numer of problems with both intentionalism and meaning externalism – but also creates new ones that might require further studies.

Keywords: intentionalism, meaning externalism, legal language, natural language, theory of meaning

Language: Polish

Received: 10.10.2016
Accepted: 12.11.2016

Published: Number 1(14)/2017, pp. 7-16.

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Number of downloads: 41