Archiwum
Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVR

William David Ross’s prima facie duties vis-à-vis Ronald Dworkin’s principles of law

Dr hab. Milena Korycka-Zirk, prof. UMK

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: prima facie duties, principles of law, hard case, collision of principles, pluralism, individualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 22-41.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.22

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Law and Values Other Than Moral. On Searching for Tropes in Józef Nowacki’s Works

Prof. dr hab. Kamil ZEIDLER

University of Gdańsk

English abstract: In his article, the author asks the question to what extent considerations in the field of axiology regarding the relationship between law and morality can be useful for the development of the legal-philosophical trend known as legal aesthetics, where the subject of interest is, most generally, the relationship between law and beauty. The starting point for reflections is the issue of axiology in the context of the works left by Józef Nowacki, including, first of all, his article “Valuing in the science of law”. Thus, the subject of the article is axiology, but in a sense that covers both ethics and aesthetics. The author distinguishes four types of description used by legal science: normative description, empirical description, theoretical description and – distinguished by the author – axiological description, which can be justified within the framework of axiological subjectivism. It involves evaluating values and either adding or subtracting them, as well as valuing, that is, comparing and weighing values. The author considers what inspiration in this regard can be drawn from axiological inquiries in general, and Nowacki’s works in particular.

Keywords: axiology, values, valuing, law and morality, principles of law, aesthetics, aesthetics of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 3(36)/2023, s. 44-50.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.3.44

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This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.