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i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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William David Ross’s prima facie duties vis-à-vis Ronald Dworkin’s principles of law

Dr hab. Milena Korycka-Zirk, prof. UMK

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: prima facie duties, principles of law, hard case, collision of principles, pluralism, individualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 22-41.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.22

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Number of downloads: 28

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: collision of principles, hard case, individualism, pluralism, prima facie duties, principles of law

The Crisis of Dialogue and Political Community: Philosophical Reflections on the Relationship Between Pluralism, Difference and Dialogue

Dr hab. Anna Rossmanith

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the relationship between pluralism, difference and dialogue as the foundation of an open society. The fundamental philosophical perspective of the study is centred around unique Levinas’ ethics. According to Levinas, we can see a difference as a creative component of a community and therefore abandon the ontological notion of the world understood as a whole and totality. In the undertaken considerations, the author refers to categories such as polis, deliberative democracy and external morality of law.

Keywords: dialogue, political community, polis, pluralism, difference, communication, open society

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(30)/2022, pp. 91-99

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.1.91

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Number of downloads: 222

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: communication, dialogue, difference, open society, pluralism, polis, political community

God’s Monism: A Further Reply to Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Dr Henry Hardy

University of Oxford

English abstract: Against Beata Polanowksa-Sygulska (BP-S), I insist on the incompatibility between the pluralism of comprehensive world-views and belief in the monist, universalist tenets of the principal world religions, noting that God the Father and God the Son were both monists. I argue that my position is entailed by Isaiah Berlin’s rejection of the unique truth of any one comprehensive outlook, and that both Berlin and BP-S confuse toleration with acceptance. I reject the charges that my position is monistic, and that I give insufficient attention to conflict within individual values, which can in any case be treated as conflict between values.

Keywords: God, monism, pluralism, religion, Isaiah Berlin

Language: English

Published: Number 3(24)/2020, pp. 130-132.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.3.130

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Number of downloads: 348

Filed Under: Reviews and discussions Tagged With: God, Isaiah Berlin, monism, pluralism, religion

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Keywords

general legal theories They Live truth Aristotle extensive interpretation Michael Moore emergency laws conventional acts axiological pluralism Deliberative philosophy monocentrism social consciousness methodology of legal sciences legal validity legal operators meaning externalism to exist spatiotemporally Tomasz Widłak Radbruch interpretative juristic presumption minority rights legislative history new technology law law and popular culture language of norms philosophie clandestine logic letter of law Stanisław Jędrczak political crisis theory of deliberative democracy omission ideological interpellation Hegel personalized medicine legal liability Adam Szot monkey trial derivative concept of legal interpretation international law Human digital twin memory studies Adolf Julius Merkl legal presumption sociological jurisprudence equal consideration principle Critical Discourse Analysis evolution of law impartiality and independence of judges Adam Zienkiewicz

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