University of Warsaw
English abstract: The main purpose of the paper is to analyse the notion of antinomies of the idea of law developed in Gustav Radbruch’s philosophy. In the first part of the paper, I analyse the most detailed explication of the notion of antinomy contained in part of Radbruch’s Philosophy of Law. I emphasize which elements, according to Radbruch, constitute the idea of law and what are the sources of their antinomianism. I indicate what elements constitute, in Radbruch’s opinion, the idea of law and what, in his opinion, the sources of their antinomianism are. In the second part of the paper, I focus on a general reconstruction of the notion of antinomy. I refer to the use of this notion in the history of philosophy and logic, in particular to one of the most important philosophical uses of antinomy in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis carried out allows me to recognize the specificity of the notion of antinomy used by Radbruch and to see its distinctiveness in comparison with Kantian antinomies. Looking at the antinomies of the idea of law from a broader philosophical perspective allows me to criticize the inadequacy of the conceptual net adopted by Radbruch, and to justify their reinterpretation independently of what has been discussed in the literature so far.
Keywords: Radbruch, Kant, philosophy of law, antinomies, justice
Published: Number 4(29)/2021, pp.82-90
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