Redakcja – Page 8

Why Moral Norms Cannot be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Załuski

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Abstract: The paper aims at formulating a certain trilemma that applies to justifying moral norms. The trilemma can be succinctly stated as follows: any attempt to derive a “moral-ought-statement” from an “is-statement” with a justificatory goal (i.e. to justify the “moral-ought-statement”), even if it were successful in its “derivation” part (i.e. logically correct), would be unsuccessful in its “justificatory” part for one of the following three reasons: (1) it would consider each human action of which a factual statement can be made as morally obligatory, thus “justifying” a large number of implausible moral norms; or (2) it would presuppose a moral norm not derivable from facts; or (3) it would not explain why the distinction – made based on extra-moral criteria – between those factual statements about human actions from which moral norms can be derived and those from which they cannot be derived should count as morally relevant. The trilemma is illustrated in the paper by an analysis of Searle’s well-known attempt at deriving “ought” from “is”. Some further implications of the trilemma regarding the proper way of justifying moral norms are also examined.

Keywords: ought-statements, is-statements, logical derivation, ethical justification, Searle, Anscombe, naturalistic ethics, divine ethics

Language: English

Received: 11.03.2019
Accepted: 11.11.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 63-74.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.63

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Number of downloads: 672

Against the Input View of Legal Gaps

Mgr Tomasz Zyglewicz

University of Warsaw

Abstract: The goal of this paper is to identify and criticize an intuitive way of thinking about gaps in the law, which I dub “the input view”. In this approach, legal gaps play the role of premises in legal reasoning in the sense that they trigger the application of, otherwise impermissible, methods of interpretation. The input view thus rests on a sharp distinction between the following two stages of legal interpretation: identification of a legal gap and filling it. The central motivation for embracing this view is to limit the scope of judicial discretion. I argue that the input view fails by its own lights by showing a class of cases in which it actually increases the scope of judicial discretion. My argument exploits the observation that, on any account of legal gaps available to the proponent of the input view, there will be cases in which a judge has discretion to say whether it involves a legal gap or not.

Keywords: legal gaps, discretion, the input view, judicial formalism

Language: English

Received: 06.12.2018
Accepted: 25.01.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 75-88.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.75

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Number of downloads: 728

Paulus Vladimiri and His Forgotten Concept of the Just War

Prof. UŁ dr hab. Tomasz Tulejski

University of Łódź

Abstract: The theoretical reflection formulated in the neo-scholastic School of Salamanca has been regarded as the source of the contemporary concept of international relations: going beyond the paradigm of the time – determined, on the one hand, by the idea of the holy war and, on the other, by the doctrine of the just war – the Salamanca scholars laid down foundations for the edifice of modern international law. In this article the author argues that similar ideas preceding the reflection of the school of Salamanca, and often going even further, had appeared a hundred years earlier in the Cracow Academia in the context of a dispute between the Kingdom of Poland and the Teutonic Order. The culmination of this dispute was the Council of Constance. The Polish argument after the battle of Grunwald was based on law, and its unique feature was the return to the universalistic (Augustinian) nature of the just war. What is the most important element in Augustinian theology of war is Christianity’s universalism and recognition of moral equality of those engaged in military operations.

Keywords: just war, holy war, Paulus Vladimiri, international law

Language: English

Received: 11.08.2019
Accepted: 28.10.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 39-50.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.39

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Number of downloads: 1,065

The Culture of Justification and Public Reason: Comments on the Motion of Members of the Polish Parliament to the Constitutional Tribunal

Prof. dr hab. Marek Smolak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The aim of the paper is to demonstrate how the culture of justification and the public reason can serve as legitimacy device in legal justifications. The idea of the culture of justification, proposed by David Dyzenhaus, makes an interesting contribution to the discussion on how to make headway with the problem of determining the limits of public authority. Applying Ron den Otter’ test of a reasonable sceptic, the author argues that the culture of justification becomes a good political and moral tool for limiting the exercise of public authority, if such a culture is understood and explained in light of the idea of public reason.

Keywords: culture of authority, culture of justification, public reason, test of a reasonable sceptic

Language: English

Received: 21.02.2019
Accepted: 04.05.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 29-38.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.29

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Number of downloads: 819

Cultural Pluralism and Religious Belief: Around Henry Hardy’s “In Search of Isaiah Berlin: A Literary Adventure”

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Abstract: The article discusses Henry Hardy’s book In Search of Isaiah Berlin: A Literary Adventure, published in the fall of 2018. The author was Berlin’s closest collaborator and is the editor or co-editor of eighteen volumes of his works and four volumes of his letters. The first part of the book is a memoir, here discussed briefly; the main focus is on the second, philosophical, section. Hardy’s investigations into Berlin’s ideas are analysed and criticised. Special attention is given to his unresolved discussion with Berlin on the relationship between pluralism and religion. A number of critical arguments against Hardy’s thesis of their mutual exclusion are put forward. The key argument is that it is possible for a true pluralist to adhere to a universalist religion. This is the same position as that adopted by Berlin.

Keywords: Isaiah Berlin, value pluralism, cultural pluralism, religious monism, universalist religion

Language: English

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 89-99.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.89

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Number of downloads: 775

Hardy on Polanowska-Sygulska on Hardy on Berlin on Pluralism and Religion

Dr Henry Hardy

University of Oxford

English abstract: Henry Hardy responds to various minor points in Beata Polanowska-Sygulska’s review of his book In Search of Isaiah Berlin, and argues that she provides no good reason to resist his claim that Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism is inconsistent with mainstream forms of religious belief.

Keywords: value pluralism, religion, Isaiah Berlin

Language: English

Published: Number 2(20)/2012, pp. 100-103.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.100

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Number of downloads: 796

Call for Papers: Public Interest – 31.03.2020

Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, journal of the Polish Section of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR) is open for submissions for its forthcoming 2020 English issue. The issue will concentrate on the subject of public interest. We will be happy to receive, review and publish papers on a wide variety of public interest research topics. Submissions can address theoretical and conceptual advancements, current challenges, legal aspects or any other contemporary topic that explores the social importance, concept and impact of public interest in all its various forms. We welcome a wide range of theoretical perspectives and research methodologies. However, due to the scope of the journal, all the papers should also explore the topic using theoretical, philosophical or sociological perspective.

Papers should be written in English and should not be longer than 40.000 characters, spaces and footnotes included. Together with the paper please send us the author form and author declaration form. The forms, together with important information on the editing and the review process, can be found at https://archiwum.ivr.org.pl/guidelines-for-authors/. We encourage non-native English speakers to proofread the text before submitting it to the journal.

Please send the papers to the editor of the issue, prof. Martyna Łaszewska-Hellriegel, LL.M. (m.laszewska-hellriegel@wpia.uz.zgora.pl). The deadline for the submission is March 31, 2020.

Professor Stanisław Czepita (1954–2018)

Dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń

University of Szczecin

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 125-128

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.125

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Number of downloads: 889

The Rule of Law in Immanuel Kant’s Political Philosophy: Two Interpretations

Mgr Michał Wieczorkowski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Abstrakt w języku polskim: The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept.

Keywords: Kant, juridical state, rule of law, liberalism, authoritarianism

Language: Polish

Received: 04.12.2018
Accepted: 05.03.2019

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 108-124

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.108

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Number of downloads: 880

« Previous Page

Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Załuski

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Mgr Tomasz Zyglewicz

University of Warsaw

Prof. UŁ dr hab. Tomasz Tulejski

University of Łódź

Prof. dr hab. Marek Smolak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Dr Henry Hardy

University of Oxford

Dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń

University of Szczecin

Mgr Michał Wieczorkowski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Mgr Aleksander Olaf Szpojankowski

Cardinal Wyszyński University in Warsaw