rule of law

Goodbye, Rule of Law? Diagnosis and Perspective

Prof. dr hab. Przemysław Kaczmarek

The University of Wrocław

English abstract: In the article, I try to show that legal dualism provides a conceptual grid for the analysis of the crisis of the rule of law. In demonstrating this, I first introduce the concept of legal dualism and then present autocratic legalism and abusive judicial review in its light. Two variants of the conceptual framework of legal dualism are suitable for describing and explaining these forms of governance. They present legal dualism as a) an instrumental action of „the main actors” in public life, and b) a social attitude that lacks a cultural imperative that allows citizens to identify with the law. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the article’s findings. First, autocratic legalism and abusive judicial review are based on the instrumentalization of the rule of law as a political ideal. Second, legal dualism as a social stance indicates that insufficient consideration of the social dimension of law has made it easier for political centres to challenge the liberal vision of the rule of law, presented by its opponents as the rule of lawyers, the social elite. A response to the charge of alienating the law in different configurations (political constitutionalism versus legal constitutionalism) is the idea of inclusivity, which can be expressed in different theoretical languages. The context for the conclusions of the article is the constitutional crisis, which is also present in the Polish legal order The empirical documentation does not determine the research methodology in the presented article. I pursue in it an approach that can be attributed to the social theory of law (B.Z. Tamanaha).

Keywords: rule of law, legal dualism, autocratic legalism, the role of judges

Language: Polish

Published: nr 4(41)/2024, pp. 53-65.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.53

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Number of downloads: 118

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Metaphysical Vagueness, Identity of Legal Cases, and the Rule of Law

mgr Zdeněk Trávníček

Masaryk University in Brno (Czechia)

English abstract: This paper proposes an approach to scientific biography from the perspective of Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical project. The choice of Leon Petrażycki (1867–1931), a philosopher and sociologist of law, who might be called an icon of the philosophy of law in Poland, results from the fact that his trajectory gives an insight into the interesting processes taking place in the scientific field, as well as in other social fields at the turn of the century up to the 1930s. Thus, L. Petrażycki is a ‘special case of what is possible’, a ‘product’ of the era. An era marked, on the one hand, by strong geopolitical divisions, corresponding to unequal flows of ideas between national scientific fields, on the other hand, characterized by high fluidity of the boundaries of social fields (science, journalism, politics), between which (up to a certain point) L. Petrażycki adroitly ‘moves’. Petrażycki’s trajectory is also interesting research-wise, as it reveals the influence of social structures on scientific positions occupied and positions takings in discourse. Furthermore, it shows how scientific failure is sublimated. Therefore, the article complements previous perspectives and is programmatic in that it can inspire similar endeavours in the future.

Keywords: rule of law, vagueness, Leibniz law, vague identity, legal indeterminacy, metaphysical vagueness, legal cases.

Language: English

Published: nr 2(39) 2024, pp. 44-58.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.44

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Number of downloads: 60

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Legality as Compliance with the Intention of the Legislator. The Understanding of Legality in Józef Nowacki’s Works

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt TOBOR

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The issue of legality is one of the most important threads in the scientific achievements of Professor Józef Nowacki. He distinguished two ways of understanding legality: a stronger one, which boils down to determining the compliance of behaviour with the contents of a duly enacted provision, and a weaker one, when the only legal basis is an obligation to employ a specific kind of evaluation. In the author’s opinion, Nowacki’s idea does not adequately take into account the fundamental problems with determining the meaning of a legal provision, i.e., problems of interpretation. The proposition that legality means compliance with the contents of a provision transfers the burden of making findings in this respect onto the subject interpreting it. The author discusses two approaches to statutory interpretation, i.e., the eclectic approach, in which there is no universal criterion for the correctness of interpretation, and the categorical approach, in which it is assumed that such a criterion exists. He points out that only a categorical approach can be reconciled with the idea of the rule of law and the role of judges as faithful agents of the legislator. Therefore, he proposes that compliance with the intention of the legislator should be taken as a criterion for the correctness of the interpretation. When legality is approached this way, the need to distinguish its stronger and weaker versions disappears. The qualification of a behaviour as legal or illegal will be based on the criterion of compliance with the intention of the legislator.

Keywords: legality, rule of law, statutory interpretation, intention of the legislator

Language: Polish

Published: Number 3(36)/2023, s. 34-43.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.3.34

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Interpretation of the Right to an Effective Remedy in Freedom of Expression Cases in the Light of the Rule of Law Principle

Dr Vygantė Milašiūtė

Vilnius University

English abstract: The paper focuses on the protection of freedom of expression of judges and prosecutors who exercise this freedom in their professional capacity to promote the rule of law, but suffer negative consequences as a result. Starting with the ECtHR Kövesi v. Romania judgment, the issues of whether legal remedy, in this context, should necessarily be judicial and what quality requirements it should meet are analysed. The paper finds that the ECtHR requires effective remedies in this field, but does not clearly exclude a possibility of non judicial remedies. The EU law, on the other hand, requires judicial remedies unless there are very limited EU law-based reasons (notably, constitutional identity arguments) that justify a possibility of a non-judicial remedy. Theoretical arguments based on substantive conception of the rule of law support the need for a judicial remedy. The study is an addition to the research into judicial independence in the light of the rule of law. It connects the ECtHR, EU law and theoretical perspectives.

Keywords: judicial independence, prosecutors, freedom of expression, rule of law, remedy

Language: English

Published: Number 2(31)/2022, pp. 7-21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.2.7

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Number of downloads: 192

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Departure from the rule of law as the consolidation of biopower. Example of Polish legislation justified by fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.

Dr hab. Arkadiusz Barut

University of Wrocław

English abstract: Throughout this article the author interprets the crisis of the rule law in Poland in 2020 caused by the phenomenon described as Covid-19 pandemic as the solidification and consolidation of biopower – the contribution of ideas and practices justified by the findings of natural sciences to the disestablishment of paradigms hitherto recognized as fundamental to the creation and application of law, that is the due process of law or its formal justice.

I proceed from the assumption that the creation and application of law must be grounded in phronesis — the Aristotelian prudence, that is the intellectual process of assessment of not only the means but also the goals. Thanks to the discernment of both the goals and the means in the same cognitive act, one gains the opportunity to distinguish individual cases and insight into specific situations. I assume the phronetics of law to justify and at once enable its acquisition of the property referred to as justice in its formal sense — predictability, non-retroactivity, generality of regulation, and so on. If, on the other hand, the law becomes subordinated to paradigms justified with the use of natural sciences, it ceases to fulfil its function. Biopower invades the legal sphere as a discourse of necessity, such a necessity is in itself the very opposite of the fine art of balancing the various competing interests, appreciating the importance of form and ritual, distinguishing the various individual cases.

The purpose of this article is to analyse the impact of the crisis referred to as the Covid-19 pandemic on law and in no way to pronounce on the medical aspects of its proliferation or express a moral or political judgement of the actions justified by the need to contain it.

Keywords: Covid – 19, pandemic, biopower, rule of law, Foucault, Legendre, Agamben

Language: English

Published: Number 3(28)/2021, pp.5-21

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2021.3.5

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Number of downloads: 351

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Transitional Justice and the Constitutional Crisis: The Case of Poland (2015–2019)

Dr Michał Krotoszyński

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: During the last four years the situation in Poland has been a matter of interest to the worldwide legal community mostly due to the constitutional crisis. Yet, the years 2015–2019 were also a time of a revival of transitional justice measures, such as cleansing the public sphere of communist symbols, remodelling of lustration law, and further reduction of pensions of communist secret service employees and officers. In this paper I argue that these spheres are interconnected and that Poland’s constitutional crisis has a transitional justice dimension. I start with an overview of retrospective instruments dealing with the communist past introduced in the last four years. Next, I turn to the constitutional crisis itself, discussing its possible explanations and transitional justice aspects. In the end I claim that the dramatic constitutional backsliding that Poland has recently experienced can be explained not only as a power grab, but also as a result of the tension between the rule of law and the principle of individual responsibility on one hand – and the resort to collective accountability in an attempt to get what the government sees as justice on the other.

Keywords: transitional justice, lustration, decommunization, Poland’s constitutional crisis, Polish Supreme Court, rule of law, sincerity principle

Language: English

Published: Number 3(21)/2019, pp. 22-39.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.3.22

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Number of downloads: 545

The Rule of Law in Immanuel Kant’s Political Philosophy: Two Interpretations

Mgr Michał Wieczorkowski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Abstrakt w języku polskim: The purpose of this article is to discuss Kant’s concept of juridical state as the foundation of the contemporary rule of law. Therefore, the article tries to answer two questions: (1) what character can be attributed to Kant’s concept of juridical state taking into account the obligations arising from it; (2) can the analysis of the Kantian juridical state have any impact on the contemporary understanding of the rule of law and if so, what can this impact be. In order to accomplish this task, moral presuppositions of Kant’s juridical state are discussed, according to the commonly accepted view that Kant’s political philosophy is closely linked with his moral and ethical reflection. Then, two interpretations of Kant’s juridical state – the liberal one and the authoritarian one – are analysed. The crucial difference between these interpretations lies in establishing the circumstances in which the duty of obedience to state power should be carried out. Then, Kantian juridical state is compared with two ways of understanding the rule of law – the material one and the formal one – in order to evaluate whether the rule of law should be considered as continuity of or rupture with the Kantian concept.

Keywords: Kant, juridical state, rule of law, liberalism, authoritarianism

Language: Polish

Received: 04.12.2018
Accepted: 05.03.2019

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 108-124

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.108

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Number of downloads: 575

Neil McCormick’s Theory of Legal Reasoning and Its Evolution

Mgr Michał Sopiński

University of Warsaw

Abstract: This paper traces, examines, and demonstrates Neil MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning and its evolution. MacCormick’s views were shaped gradually so his theory could be divided into two main stages. Therefore, the use of the diachronic approach is justified. The aim of this paper is to analyse the difference between the theses of the theory of legal reasoning explained in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978) and general revisions to this theory marked in Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (2005). According to the author, the most important change in MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is an examination of the role of deductive reasoning in the process of judicial reasoning. This change leads to an extension of the logical aspects of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning (legal syllogism) to include rhetorical aspects (argumentative character of law) and ethical aspects (the idea of the rule of law). The evolution of the MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the changes in contemporary philosophy of law.

Keywords: legal reasoning, MacCormick, legal syllogism, rhetoric, rule of law

Language: Original printed in Polish, English online translation

Received: 20.02.2018
Accepted: 19.05.2018

Published: Number 1(19)/2019, pp. 63-78

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.1.63ENG

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Number of downloads: 358

Rule of law, public philosophy and moral responsibility of scientists

Prof. dr hab. Lech Morawski

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

English abstract: The paper discusses some relationships between the rule of law and the public philosophy. It is unquestionable that nowadays the scientism has become one of the dominant ideologies of industrial and post-industrial societies. Scientists and researchers take an active part in public life, are advisors to governments and corporations, comment in the media important public events. Thus, the problem arises of their moral and legal responsibility for what they say and do in public life. In my opinion, we may distinguish two different models of responsibility, which I call a model of scientist as an ordinary citizen and model of scientist always on duty. To put it another way, we may ask, whether the scientist in public life like an ordinary citizen can act in accordance with his political, economic or religious sympathies and preferences or just like a judge, priest or a physician is always „on duty” and always must follow all the rules of his profession. I defend the view that the adoption of the second model is one of the necessary preconditions of the existence of informed and rational public opinion and thus, the informed and rational rule of law.

Keywords: rule of law, moral responsibility, legal responsibility, public philosophy

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 85-94

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Number of downloads: 220

Four puzzles about the rule of law: why, what, where? And who cares? (part 2)

Prof. dr Martin Krygier

UNSW Sydney

English abstract: Central among the many obscurities that attend the rule of law are those named in the title of the article. The first part contains some preliminary remarks and attempt to answer the first question. This attempt is based on distinguishing to ways of understanding what rule of law is. By the first way rule of law is a theological concept, i.e. to know what it is we have to know its aims and by the second, anatomical one, the most important thing to understand it are rules and institutions that are usually conceived as its part. The authors holds a position that only the first way is appropriate and gives his own interpretation of aims of rule of law. This aim is legal reduction of the possibility of arbitrary exercise of power that is connected with four important reductions – of domination, of fear, of indignity, and of confusion.

Keywords: rule of law, arbitrariness, exercise of power, aims of rule of law

Language: Polish
Translated by: Katarzyna Mikołajczyk-Graj

Published: Number 2(15)/2012, pp. 5-19.

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Number of downloads: 330