Archiwum
Filozofii Prawa
i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVR

On the Difference Between a Strong and Weak Version of the Idea of an Internal Point of View

Dr Paweł Jabłoński

The University of Wrocław

English abstract: This article aims to theoretically expose the claim that the choice between framing the activity of courts in hard cases as “purely political” or “purely juridical” activity is a false choice. I achieve this goal in the following way. First, I introduce the notion of an epistemic account of the internal point of view, which is linked to the conditions of legal cognition. Then I propose a distinction between a strong and weak account of the internal point of view so understood. Such criteria as the autonomy of the law, the relevance of the subject factor in the application of the law, or the arguability of the content of the law play a fundamental role here. Next, I provide a more detailed characterization of the strong view of the internal point of view and the weak one. I try to show that a sharp line between what is legal and what is political is possible only with the adoption of a strong account of the internal point of view. At the same time, I give reasons why such an account of the internal point of view should be rejected. In the concluding section, I briefly summarize the most important findings.

Keywords: internal point of view, legal cognition, Hart

Language: Polish

Published: nr 4(41)/2024, pp. 19-35.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.19

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Number of downloads: 193

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Critical Analysis of the Hypothesis About the Usefulness of the Idea of Conceptual Metaphor in the Interpretation of Law

dr hab. Robert Piszko, prof. US

University of Szczecin

English abstract: Since George Lakoff and Mark Johnson published a book entitled Metaphors We Live By, metaphors and their role in everyday life have been recognised. Metaphor has henceforth ceased to be a means only of poetic imagination and rhetorical embellishment. It began to be seen also as a form of human thinking, a tool of cognition. Metaphor began to be seen in areas of life where it had hitherto been absent. These areas included law. However, the enthusiasm of authors who see the great role of metaphorical imagery in law is not justified. An analysis of the examples of metaphors in legal texts given in scientific studies indicates too much freedom in qualifying certain expressions as metaphors and seeing their role or usefulness where there is none – that is, also in legal texts and in the interpretation of law. Metaphors are mistaken for phraseological compounds and for previously metaphorical expressions that have permanently lost this character as a result of conventionalization or lexicalisation. The potential effect of adopting a cognitivist perspective has previously been otherwise achieved in the legal sciences at the expected level. The results indicated as possible with the tools of cognitive science are nothing new, and the possibility of achieving them is either debatable or impossible. The conceptual metaphor, on the other hand, can play an important role when it comes to the justification of judicial or administrative decisions, the content of law textbooks, statements of doctrinal representatives with regard to the law Using the language of cognitive science, the radial structures of legal and ethical concepts can more promisingly be made the subject of research, which can enable the coexistence of humans and artificial intelligence. The research material was mainly investigated using the method of linguistic analysis.

Keywords: metaphor, phraseological association, conceptual motivation, radial structures, legal reasoning, legal cognition, interpretation of law

Language: Polish

Published: nr 2(39) 2024, p. 19-33.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.2.19

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Number of downloads: 194

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.