Dr Paweł Ochmann
Jagiellonian University
Keywords: Heuristics, Kahneman, Tversky, reasoning, judgement heuristics, judicial application of the law, piercing the corporate veil, adjudication
English abstract: Heuristic reasoning means abbreviated and simplified reasoning. As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have proved, judgement heuristics are relatively frequently present in human thinking, despite the risk that they may lead to certain cognitive errors. That is why it is highly likely that these heuristics may be present also in the thinking of judges when they apply the law and make judicial decisions. Therefore, the article departs from the statement that it is possible to encounter heuristic thinking also in judicial activity of Polish courts. The purpose of these reflections is to verify the statement thus posed by means of empirical identification of cases decided in a heuristic way, as well as to explain the consequences of deciding them in such a way. The article is systematized as follows. The first section presents heuristic thinking, in order to articulate the general characteristics that should be identified in specific judicial decisions issued by Polish courts in order to determine if this kind of reasoning is present. The second section of the article analyses selected judgments that may be perceived in terms of heuristic thinking as testimony of its presence in the practice of applying Polish law. Meanwhile, the next section of the article deals with some consequences of the analysed decisions having a heuristic character for the subject matter in which they were issued. Finally, in the last section, the conducted analysis leads to the formulation of a few reflections on general admissibility and usefulness of heuristic reasoning in the practice of judicial application of the law.
Language: polish
Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 75–91.
Number of downloads: 40
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Cite this articleAPA, Chicago, OSCOLA, BibTeX, RIS
P. Ochmann (2026) Heuristic Reasoning in the Judicial Practice of Polish Courts and Its Selected Implications for Applying the Law. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2026, no. 2(47), 75-91. https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.75.