Legal positivism holds that the validity of law depends on its social sources, not on its moral merits. Yet that single label covers deeply different positions – from Austin and Kelsen to Hart and Joseph Raz’s exclusive positivism – as well as a lasting argument with the tradition’s critics. This collection gathers texts on positivism and on that debate. Every article is free to read in open access.
Hans Kelsen and the Pure Theory of Law
Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) is among the most influential legal theorists of the twentieth century. His Pure Theory of Law (Reine Rechtslehre, 1934; 2nd ed. 1960) is a programme for a science of law purified of sociological, psychological and moral elements: law is a hierarchical order of norms (Stufenbau, a conception developed with Adolf Julius Merkl) whose unity is grounded in the basic norm (Grundnorm). Kelsen co-drafted the Austrian Constitution of 1920 and fathered the European model of centralised constitutional review.
The “Archive” published – in Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki’s translation – a text by Stanley L. Paulson, the leading contemporary Kelsen scholar: Kelsen jako odmieniec. The Polish reception of Kelsen is documented by Monika Zalewska’s reconstruction of his discussion with Jerzy Wróblewski.
Disputes within legal positivism
Legal positivists share the conviction that the validity of law depends on its social sources rather than its moral merits (the separation thesis). Beneath that common label lie deeply different positions: Austin’s naturalistic positivism, Kelsen’s anti-naturalistic normativism, Hart’s rule of recognition, and contemporary inclusive, exclusive and conventionalist variants – all documented in the texts below.
Selected texts
- Kelsen jako odmieniec. Obrona radykalnej teorii norm – Stanley L. Paulson, No. 4(29)/2021 (in Polish, transl. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki)
- Why Legal Conventionalism Fails – Adam Dyrda, No. 1(10)/2015 (in English)
- Sedno idei pozytywizmu prawniczego – Stanley L. Paulson, No. 2(15)/2012 (in Polish, transl. Marcin Romanowicz)
- Reguła uznania – remedium na zewnętrzną niepewność prawa? – Urszula Anna Kosielińska-Grabowska, No. 1(4)/2012 (in English)
- Historia pewnego przypisu. Próba rekonstrukcji dyskusji Hansa Kelsena z Jerzym Wróblewskim – Monika Zalewska, No. 1(2)/2011 (in Polish)
See also
Classics of Modern Legal Philosophy and Theory · Ronald Dworkin i debata z pozytywizmem. Profiles: Herbert L.A. Hart · Joseph Raz · Gustav Radbruch.
The debate with Dworkin
The most famous dispute in contemporary legal theory – between positivism and Ronald Dworkin’s critique of it.
- Nowe wyzwanie dla pozytywizmu prawniczego – Herbert L.A. Hart, No. 2(9)/2014 (in Polish, translation)
- Prequel do Hartowskiego Postscriptum – Andrzej Grabowski, No. 2(9)/2014 (in Polish)
- Debata Fish – Dworkin – Michał Pełka, No. 2(11)/2015 (in Polish)
- Filozofia prawa międzynarodowego Ronalda Dworkina – Tomasz Widłak, No. 1(12)/2016 (in Polish)
- O wolności akademickiej – Paweł Jabłoński, No. 4(45)/2025 (in Polish)
For authors
The “Archive” publishes articles in legal theory and philosophy – including work on Kelsen and legal positivism – in Polish and English, in open access with no publication charges and with double-blind peer review. The journal is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and ERIH PLUS (100 points on the Polish ministerial list). See the guidelines for authors.
An editorial collection. Last updated: July 2026.