Dr Kamil Jesiołowski
Kutnik, Kalinowski and Partners, Attorneys-at-Law
Keywords: determinism, free will, compatibilism, criminal law
English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the positions, found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law, regarding determinism and free will. It appears that the predominant approach in the doctrine is both incompatibilist and libertarian. In contrast, this article adopts a compatibilist position, inspired by M.S. Moore’s concept outlined in his book Mechanical Choices. In the article, I defend the thesis that criminal responsibility can be maintained regardless of whether determinism is true or false. Defending this thesis required addressing specific arguments found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law. On this basis, I identify the main positions held by legal scholars, namely: (1) the position that determinism renders criminal law meaningless; (2) the position that there exists a “good” moderate determinism and a “bad” extreme determinism; (3) the position that determinism is not justified in light of common sense; (4) the position that indeterminism, more than determinism, is acceptable in judicial rulings; (5) the position that describes determinism in the context of free will without making value judgments. I conclude that a reconstruction of the foundations of criminal responsibility would by no means be necessary, even if it were acknowledged that the world is deterministic, while positions (1)–(4), upon closer analysis, can be weakened – if not outright rejected.
Language: polish
Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 22–40.
Number of downloads: 42
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Cite this articleAPA, Chicago, OSCOLA, BibTeX, RIS
K. Jesiołowski (2026) Determinism and Free Will in the Doctrine of Criminal Law: Selected Contexts. A Compatibilist Proposal. Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2026, no. 2(47), 22-40. https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.22.