Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVRwww.ivr.org.pl

Search Results for: international law

Critical Approaches to International Law according to China Miéville and Bhupinder S. Chimni

Dr hab. Tomasz Srogosz, prof. UKEN

University of the National Education Commission in Kraków

English abstract: Research purpose: The aim of the article is to assess the usefulness of Marxist approaches to international law in the discussion on the existing and developing international legal order. It is a proposal to enrich the theoretical foundations of the discourse on international law that takes place within the walls of Polish scientific and academic centres. Questions arise as to whether Marxist approaches to the law of nations solve the problem of the possibility of changes taking into account the positions of the “ordinary people”, i.e., the Marxian working class, within the existing imperial international legal order? Or maybe this order ruthlessly defends the interests of the capitalist class, which makes any evolutionary change beneficial to the “ordinary people” impossible? Research assumptions/methodology: The article uses the legal theory method, which boils down to analysing doctrinal views on the Marxist theory of law, starting with Marx and Engels, to Pashukanis, and ending with Chimni and Miéville.
Basic theses/findings: The presented Marxist approaches to international law (Chimni and Miéville) differ in terms of the theoretical basis (Miéville drew on Pashuknis and Chimni directly on Marx), which in turn leads to different views on the essence of international law (Chimni proclaims the “class approach” while Miéville builds his theory around Pashukanis’ “commodity theory of law”) and the possibility of reforming the law of nations. Originality of results/epistemic value: Chimni’s approach turns out to be more useful, as, unlike Miéville, he sees the possibility of changing the imperial international legal order serving the transnational capitalist class within the international rule of law and with the use of human rights. Miéville’s theory is too skeptical and nihilistic. Yet, this should not prevent

Keywords: Marxism, international law, imperialism, reform, social class

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 97-119.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.97

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Ronald Dworkin’s Philosophy of International Law

Dr Tomasz Widłak

University of Gdańsk


Abstract: During his academic career Ronald Dworkin did not show much interest in the fundamental philosophical questions on international legal issues. This had changed towards the end of his life when he wrote an article titled „A New Philosophy for International Law” published posthumously. The aim of this article is to summarise the key arguments of Dworkin’s approach, address some of its critics as well as to suggest the possibility of further development of this discussion in the context of current global constitutionalism. In the first part, three thesis of Dworkin’s approach are reconstructed. The first one claims that international law requires interpretative understanding which should be grounded in the political morality of the international community. The second thesis can be formulated as follows: the legitimacy of political power at the national and international levels is uniform. The third thesis demands the implementation of the principle of salience in international law as the basic structural principle. After discussing critically Dworkin’s theory, in second part the article proposes a constitutional interpretation of the new philosophy for international law. Two conditions of global constitutionalism have to be satisfied by the theory in order to consider it as a constitutionalist approach. The first condition is the primacy of individual rights and second is the primacy of constitutional norms within the system. The conclusion is that the conditions are satisfied for Dworkin’s new philosophy of international law and his principle of salience is in fact a deeply constitutional arrangement based on moral justification. Dworkin’s proposal constitutes only a rough sketch, however there is a potential for developments. Lawyers and philosophers have at least an intellectual responsibility for building new viable theoretical models for international law.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, international law, international society, principle of salience, global constitutionalism, constitutionalization of international law, international legal theory, global law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 64-77.

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Number of downloads: 541

Congress of the Polish Section of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR): “Social Change and Legal Change: Axiology, the Constitution, European Integration” Faculty of Law and Administration, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, 23–25 September 2024.

dr Patryk Patoleta

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin

Report language:Polish

Published in: Issue 4(45)/2025, pp. 128–131.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.128

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4th Mountain Trek-Conference on the Philosophy of Law Organized by the Polish Section of the IVR “The case of the philosophy of law”, the Giant Mountains, 20–22 September 2025

Dr Tomasz Raburski

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 117–119.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.117

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Number of downloads: 82

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Tischner Seminar, Faculty of Law and Administration of the University of Lodz, 24 June 2025

Mgr Paweł Boike

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

Dr Mateusz Pękala

Ignatianum University in Cracow

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 112–116.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.112

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Number of downloads: 76

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Heuristic Reasoning in the Judicial Practice of Polish Courts and Its Selected Implications for Applying the Law

Dr Paweł Ochmann

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Heuristic reasoning means abbreviated and simplified reasoning. As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have proved, judgement heuristics are relatively frequently present in human thinking, despite the risk that they may lead to certain cognitive errors. That is why it is highly likely that these heuristics may be present also in the thinking of judges when they apply the law and make judicial decisions. Therefore, the article departs from the statement that it is possible to encounter heuristic thinking also in judicial activity of Polish courts. The purpose of these reflections is to verify the statement thus posed by means of empirical identification of cases decided in a heuristic way, as well as to explain the consequences of deciding them in such a way. The article is systematized as follows. The first section presents heuristic thinking, in order to articulate the general characteristics that should be identified in specific judicial decisions issued by Polish courts in order to determine if this kind of reasoning is present. The second section of the article analyses selected judgments that may be perceived in terms of heuristic thinking as testimony of its presence in the practice of applying Polish law. Meanwhile, the next section of the article deals with some consequences of the analysed decisions having a heuristic character for the subject matter in which they were issued. Finally, in the last section, the conducted analysis leads to the formulation of a few reflections on general admissibility and usefulness of heuristic reasoning in the practice of judicial application of the law.

Key words: Heuristics, Kahneman, Tversky, reasoning, judgement heuristics, judicial application of the law, piercing the corporate veil, adjudication

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 75–91.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.75

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Number of downloads: 93

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Determinism and Free Will in the Doctrine of Criminal Law: Selected Contexts. A Compatibilist Proposal

Dr Kamil Jesiołowski

Kutnik, Kalinowski and Partners, Attorneys-at-Law

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the positions, found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law, regarding determinism and free will. It appears that the predominant approach in the doctrine is both incompatibilist and libertarian. In contrast, this article adopts a compatibilist position, inspired by M.S. Moore’s concept outlined in his book Mechanical Choices. In the article, I defend the thesis that criminal responsibility can be maintained regardless of whether determinism is true or false. Defending this thesis required addressing specific arguments found in the Polish doctrine of criminal law. On this basis, I identify the main positions held by legal scholars, namely: (1) the position that determinism renders criminal law meaningless; (2) the position that there exists a “good” moderate determinism and a “bad” extreme determinism; (3) the position that determinism is not justified in light of common sense; (4) the position that indeterminism, more than determinism, is acceptable in judicial rulings; (5) the position that describes determinism in the context of free will without making value judgments. I conclude that a reconstruction of the foundations of criminal responsibility would by no means be necessary, even if it were acknowledged that the world is deterministic, while positions (1)–(4), upon closer analysis, can be weakened – if not outright rejected.

Key words: determinism, free will, compatibilism, criminal law

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 22–40.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.22

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Number of downloads: 91

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The Perfect State from the Point of View of Pascal’s Reflections about Law and Justice

Dr Edyta Godziszewska

University of Kalisz

English abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse the possibility of the existence of a perfect state in the light of Blaise Pascal’s reflections on justice and law. The work juxtaposes utopian visions of ideal states, based on the moral perfection of citizens, as well as modern concepts derived from natural law or the social contract, with Pascal’s critical perspective, which emphasized the sinful human nature and the inevitable link between law and force or coercion. The analysis is based on seventeenth-century philosophical and political literature as well as on interpretations of Pascal’s texts. The main focus is on his reflections on the limitations of human justice and the need for law to maintain order and ensure security. The article argues that a perfect state in the earthly sense is impossible, and that true justice belongs only to the divine sphere. The originality of the study lies in presenting Pascal as a critic of rationalist utopias, one who showed that the state cannot be perfect, even though its existence ultimately has its source in God.

Key words: state, law, justice, order, reason

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 7–21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.7

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Number of downloads: 84

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