legal interpretation

Regarding Justification of Interpretive Claims

Prof. US dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń, prof. dr hab. Maciej Zieliński

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The duty to provide justification for claims is the realization of the postulate of criticism in the academia. Decisions regarding legal interpretation (regardless of whether they are formulated in the process of applying the law or outside this process) are made in the form of claims about a binding legal norm with a certain content. Validation of such claims requires their justification, just like in the academia. And in the academia, a claim remains theoretical until someone presents an inter-subjectively verified justification for it. The aim of this article is precisely that: to indicate the necessity to justify interpretive claims (both partial and final) in the process of interpretation. As a starting point in the process of demonstrating the need to formulate such a justification, we choose the derivative conception of legal interpretation, which provides for the duty to justify interpretive claims for methodological reasons (and which is an intrinsic element of the content of legal directives in this conception, at least implicitly). We present and discuss the types of justifications for interpretive claims and their variants (weak and strong). Furthermore, we analyse the difference between justifying ordinary and interpretive claims. Finally, we also identify the consequences of failure to provide such justifications.

Keywords: justification of interpretive claim, legal interpretation, postulate of criticism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 7-18.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.7

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Number of downloads: 688

Should a Court Be Understanding for the Legislator? On Legislative Error from the Perspective of the Theory of Legal Interpretation

Mgr Marek Suska

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: In the actual legislative processes, errors are often made: the legislator’s intentions are not always properly expressed in the legal provisions or there is insufficient clarity. The discrepancy between what the legislator said and what they meant to say poses a serious challenge to the theory and practice of legal interpretation. In this paper, the author analyses two possible reactions to a legislative error: correcting it or applying the provision in its literal meaning. The considerations are based on two decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, because in criminal law the protection of the prima facie understanding of the text is a very important value. In the final part of the paper, the author indicates factors which can affect the court’s attitude towards a legislative error in a specific case.

Keywords: legislative error, scrivener’s error, legal interpretation, law-making

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 99-110.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.99

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Number of downloads: 672

On Possible Applications of Paul Ricoeur’s Thought in Legal Theory

Dr Marcin Pieniążek

Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University

English abstract: The paradigm of legal positivism, historically the most important attempt at turning law into science, has been subject to thorough criticism in past decades. The criticism has concerned the most important features of legal positivism, and especially the assumption of separation of law and morality, the dogma of statue being the only source of law, and the linguistic methods of interpreting legal texts. With a crisis of the positive paradigms, the demand for new, humanistic grounds for analysing philosophical and legal questions is intensifying. This is the reason for this article’s attempt to point to the application of Paul Ricoeur’s achievements to the key questions of the philosophy of law. It must be emphasised that his works, and especially Soimême comme un autre, may serve as a foundation for a philosophy of law rejecting the problematic claims about the dualism of being and obligation, the distinction of descriptive and prescriptive languages, and also the separation of law and morality. Thanks to this, the legal topos pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept) finds a reinforcement in the ontology of the subject applying law and can be understood as an ethically significant pattern of identity of the self. Equally fruitful seems the possibility of combining the questions of the ontology of the subject applying law with the question of a legal text and its interpretation. The assumption of Ricoeur’s perspective leads to a reduction in the distance between the legal text and its addressee, emphasised by the critics of legal positivism. This rapprochement becomes possible thanks to the connection of the question of the narrative that a legal text is with the question of narrativisation of the subject (i.e. the interpreter of a legal text), being itself in the ipse sense, i.e. applying the law.

Keywords: Paul Ricoeur, legal positivism, legal interpretation

Language: English

Published: Number 1(10)/2015, pp. 79-88

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2015.1.79

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Number of downloads: 517

Does American jurisprudence have any rules of interpretation of Constitution?

Dr Anna Tomza

University of Łódź

English abstract: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.

Keywords: American jurisprudence, legal interpretation, rules of interpretation, Constitution

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(9)/2014, pp. 125-133

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Number of downloads: 328

The ways of understanding creative (constructive) interpretation

Dr Olgierd Bogucki

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the notion of creative interpretation (of any text, especially creative interpretation of a legal text). The author points out that there are two different meanings of the expression “creative interpretation”. The first one can be called “ontological” and the second one – “methodological”. A given interpretation is ontologically creative when it creates a new object (which is a new meaning of some sort) and it is methodologically creative when it is established without applying any rules. Different theoretic approaches to legal interpretation presuppose different relations between ontological creativeness and methodological creativeness. The article explores some of them. The main thesis of the article is that when we say that a given interpretation is ontologically creative, we do not need to say it is methodologically creative (and vice versa).

Keywords: legal interpretation, interpretation ontologically creative, interpretation methodologically creative

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(6)/2013, pp. 21-33.

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Number of downloads: 375

Legal Databases and Their Functions in the Process of Interpreting and Applying the Law

Dr Wiesław Staśkiewicz, Prof. dr hab. Tomasz Stawecki

University of Warsaw

English abstract: This article deals with the implications of the widespread practice of use of legal databases in Polish judicial practice. Apart from the undeniable positive effects of development of an electronic civilization, the article deals with the negative effects of use of databases. This is because a conflict arises between the possibilities offered by the latest technology in the form of easy access to legal texts, commentaries and thousands of judicial rulings, and the unique historical experience of the judiciary in a former communist country, methods of legal interpretation sustained by legal positivism, and domination by a syllogistic model for application of the law. All results in dysfunction of legal databases. A kind of “hybrid interpretation of law” is formed, which is a combination of a legacy, the effects of transformation of the economy and the system, as well as the new rules of law, on the one hand, and the ideology of bound judicial decision on the other. The nature of the “hybrid interpretation of law” is the infinite scope for citing judicial rulings and commentaries available in the databases without taking a broader theoretical view – without supporting arguments, and so the citing of a ruling has become the basis for adjudication. The question of whether the possibilities that electronic databases offer will cause interpretation of this kind to turn into a new form of legal rhetoric, or whether it will remain merely a means of adaptation of the discretionary power of judges to legal positivism doctrine, and thus the sophism of the period of transformation, remains an open one.

Keywords: legal database, legal interpretation, hybrid interpretation of law, legal positivism, syllogistic model for application of the law

Language: English

Published: Number 1(4)/2012, pp. 84-105.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2012.1.84

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Number of downloads: 571

Story of a footnote. Attempt to reconstruct the discussion of Hans Kelsen and Jerzy Wróblewski

Mgr Monika Zalewska

University of Łódź

English abstract: Article is an attempt to provide reconstruction of the discourse between Hans Kelsen and Jerzy Wróblewski. The main motive of the article are three footnotes from Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of Norms where he considers such issues as the meaning of the legal norm, and legal interpretation. Reconstruction leads to conclusion that if one treats H. Kelsen’s argumentation as a critique of Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory, this critique doesn’t have sound basis, because it’s essence is not to point contradictions and weakness of the theory, but it is led from the point of view of pure theory of law which itself at some points suffers from the lack of coherency. Thus the other approach of the interpretation of footnotes is offered, to treat them as an some kind of scientific testimony, and as a tool which has on scope to make improvement in pure theory of law. Additionally it has been pointed out, that Hans Kelsen didn’t put the main interest on Marxist issues which occurred in Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory, but on those elements which have it’s importance and are discussed till present day.

Keywords: Hans Kelsen, Jerzy Wroblewski, legal interpretation, normativism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 75-85.

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Number of downloads: 342

References:

Adomeit K., Der Begriff der Rechtsnorm, „Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen-Institutes”, Band 7, Wiedeń 1982.

di Bernardo G., Normative Structures of the Social World, Rodopi 1988

Ebenstein W., The Pure Theory of Law: Demythologizing Legal Thought, „California Law Review” 1971/59.

Fritzsche T., Die Reine Rechtslehre im Lichte des Kritischen Rationalismus, „Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsens – Instituts”, Band 23, Wiedeń 2002.

Kelsen H., Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, Wiedeń 1979

Kelsen H., Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, Scienta Aalen 1960.

Kelsen H., Reine Rechtslehre, Wiedeń 1960.

Kucsko-Stadlmayer G., Rechtsnormbegriff und Arten der Rechtnormen, „Schriften des Hans Kelsen – Instituts”, Band 18, Wiedeń 1992.

Opałek K., Norm, Wert, und Werturteil, „Schriftreihe des Hans Kelsen – Institutes” Band 7, Wiedeń 1982.

Paulson S.L., An Empowerment Theory of Legal Norm, „Ratio Iuris” 1988/1.

Paulson S.L., Litschewsky-Paulson B., Normativity and Norms, Oxford 1998.

Paulson S.L., Stolleis M., Hans Kelsen Staatslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts, Mohr Siebeck 2005.

Paulson S.L., Zwei radykale Objektivirungsprogramme In der Rechtslehre Hans Kelsens, w: Paulson S.L., Stolleis M., Hans Kelsen Staatslehrer und Rechtstheoretiker des 20. Jahrhunderts, Mohr Siebeck 2005.

Raz J., The Purity of the Pure Theory, „Revue Internationale de Philosophie” 1981/138.

Schreirer F., Rechtsnorm und Rechtssatz, „Schriftenreihe des Hans Kelsen – Institutes”, Band 7, Wiedeń 1982.

Wróblewski J., Cognition of Norms and Cognition Through Norms, w: di Bernardo G., Normative Structures of the Social World, Rodopi 1988.

Wróblewski J., Semantic Basis of the Theory of Legal Interpretaton, „Logique at Analyse” 1963/21–24.

Wróblewski J., The Problem of the Meaning of the Legal Norm, „Österreiches Zeitschrift Für Öffentliches Recht” 1964/3–4.

Monografia Jarosława Wyrembaka „Zasadnicza wykładnia znamion przestępstw. Pozycja metody językowej oraz rezultatów jej użycia” w perspektywie teoretycznoprawnej

Dr Agnieszka Bielska Brodziak, Dr Sławomir Tkacz

University of Silesia

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 91-99.

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Number of downloads: 425

References:

Barak A., Purposive Interpretation In Law, Princeton 2007.
Bielska-Brodziak A., Interpretacja tekstu prawnego na podstawie orzecznictwa podatkowego, Warszawa 2009.
Dedecius K., Prawo a język, w: Stelmach J. (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2003.
Kozak A., Pojmowanie prawa w teorii wykładni, Wrocław 1997.
Nowacki J., Analogia legis, Warszawa 1966.
Opałek K., Wróblewski J., Zagadnienia teorii prawa, Warszawa 1969.
Płeszka K., Uzasadnienie decyzji interpretacyjnych przez ich konsekwencje, Kraków 1996.
Spyra T., Granice wykładni prawa, Kraków 2006.
Stelmach J. (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2003.
Tobor Z., Bezstronność sędziego, „Przegląd Sądowy” 2005/6
Tobor Z., Bielska-Brodziak A., Tkacz S., Kilka uwag o wykładni prawa karnego, „Studia Prawnicze” 2009/3.
Wróblewski J., Rozumienie prawa i jego wykładnia, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1990.
Wróblewski J., Sądowe stosowanie prawa, Warszawa 1988.
Wróblewski J., O naukowości prawoznawstwa, „Państwo i Prawo” 1965/8–9.
Wyrembak J., Zasadnicza wykładnia znamion przestępstw. Pozycja metody językowej oraz rezultatów jej użycia, Warszawa 2009.
Zieliński M., Wykładnia prawa. Zasady. Reguły. Wskazówki, Warszawa 2002.

Different texts – similar interpretation. Interpretation of law and interpretation of the Bible

Mgr Bartłomiej Dębski

English abstract: This paper concerns similarity of interpretation of law and interpretation of the Bible. It focuses on the same mechanisms grounding both the principles of interpretation of law and interpretation of the Bible. First, similar textual principles of interpretation are briefly described. Second, extra-textual principles of interpretation are given. In the second part some shortcomings of legal extra-textual principles of interpretation are also indicated. At the end of the text, a theory that allows to disregard these shortcomings is proposed.

Keywords: legal interpretation, Bible, interpretation of the Bible, dynamic interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(12)/2016, p. 5-11.

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Number of downloads: 392

Fish – Dworkin debate as an example of dispute about practice of interpretation of law

Dr Michał Pełka

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of the article is to critically asses the theories of interpretation developed by two prominent philosophers, namely Stanley Fish and Ronald Dworkin. After first describing and reconstructing their ideas the paper then identifies problems concerning the stance according to which everything in applying law depends on interpretation. The critic is based on the Ludwig’s Wittgenstein remark that there must be grasping the rule (or more broadly a meaning of any word) which is not interpretation, otherwise we end up in regressus ad infinitum fallacy. Paper’s main claim is that although the theory of R. Dworkin is not fully free from defects it has nevertheless more explanation power than the opponent’s propositions.

Keywords: legal interpretation, meaning, Stanley Fish, Ronald Dworkin, Ludwig Wittgenstein

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(11)/2015, p. 86-105.

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Number of downloads: 599

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