Articles – Page 21

On Legal Interpretation and Its Practical Dimension: The Context of Judicial Application of the Law

Prof. dr hab. Leszek Leszczyński

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University

English abstract: The aim of the study is to identify those aspects of legal interpretation which may strengthen its practical dimension. The operative interpretation, distinguished in the theory of law, needs to be developed, inter alia, in order to strengthen the legal discourse as a whole and to contribute to better communication and deeper integration between dogmatic and theoretical legal studies. As a result, the theory of interpretation itself would become more complete. Three most important aspects of giving a practical dimension to various interpretive approaches are analysed in the paper. The first of them is the use of the so-called decision-making character of the operative interpretation, when such interpretation is made in connection with the findings of fact, which limits its scope, while at the same time broadening the number of the established normative bases for decisions, and also in the context of the subsequently-formulated justification of the interpretative decision. The second one is its validation-derivative approach, indicating the phases of operative interpretation, the multiplicity of carriers of law taken into account and the distinction of roles played at particular phases by the each type of rules of interpretation. Finally, the third aspect points to the need to include operative interpretation in the comparative approach, the main determinant of which are the differences of interpretation in particular branches of law.

Keywords: operative legal interpretation, decision-making character of interpretation, validation-derivative approach, comparative approach

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 66-80.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.66

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Number of downloads: 808

On an Interpreter’s Game with the Legal Text and Extratextual Factors in the Derivative Concept of Legal Interpretation

Dr Paweł Jabłoński, prof. UWr dr hab. Przemysław Kaczmarek

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the derivative concept of legal interpretation from the point of view of the structure of limits of the juridical power. This structure includes the politico-legal culture, the legal text, the juridical culture, and personal factors, such as ethical and aesthetic judgements.

These days, the derivative concept is the most influential Polish theory of legal interpretation. According to this concept the process of interpreting the law is a kind of a game between the legal text and extratextual factors, which are treated as extratextual limits of juridical power. On the one hand, the legal text does not determine the full meaning of the law, although it has great importance for it. On the other hand, the derivative concept precisely identifies certain others factors that are relevant for the content of law.

Keywords: derivative concept of legal interpretation, limits of juristic power, legal text

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 49-65.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.49ENG

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Number of downloads: 478

Dialogical Concept of Legal Interpretation

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, mgr Konrad Kobyliński

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The purpose of this text is to present an outline of the dialogical concept of legal interpretation. It involves the need to establish the relationship between the legislature and courts. In the normative dimension, this concept includes an analysis of assumptions about the mutual roles of the legislature and courts in determining the substance of the law. In the descriptive dimension, the authors present tools that enable communication between the legislature and courts in order to improve the interpretation process. The authors describe the requirements for communication between courts and the legislature, and refer to existing solutions in Poland and the United States. In the text the importance of this issue is only signaled, but the authors believe that it is worth further research.

Keywords: legal interpretation, strategies of interpretation, communication theory of legal interpretation

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 35-48.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.35ENG

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Number of downloads: 510

Limits of Interpretive Disagreements in Jurisprudence

Dr hab. Adam Dyrda, prof. dr hab. Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki

Jagiellonian University

English abstract: Does legal interpretation have borders? Are these borders conventionally established? What makes the given ‘legal reasons’, set forth by certain normative theories of legal interpretation, acceptable in legal discourse (even if the reasons are wrong)? In the present paper, we argue that the notion of the borders of legal interpretation is linked to the general notion of the borders of law. We indicate the scope of ‘interpretive theoretical disagreements’ in law, as discussed by certain new, ‘institutional’ versions of legal positivism. Interpretive borders are not fully determined by the given ‘institutional’ framework. In our view, these borders are also more generally determined inter alia by certain truistic (platitudinous) beliefs related to law and interpretation.

Keywords: interpretive methodology, limits of legal interpretation, legal positivism, second-order rules of legal interpretation, normative theories of legal interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 19-34.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.19

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Number of downloads: 881

Regarding Justification of Interpretive Claims

Prof. US dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń, prof. dr hab. Maciej Zieliński

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The duty to provide justification for claims is the realization of the postulate of criticism in the academia. Decisions regarding legal interpretation (regardless of whether they are formulated in the process of applying the law or outside this process) are made in the form of claims about a binding legal norm with a certain content. Validation of such claims requires their justification, just like in the academia. And in the academia, a claim remains theoretical until someone presents an inter-subjectively verified justification for it. The aim of this article is precisely that: to indicate the necessity to justify interpretive claims (both partial and final) in the process of interpretation. As a starting point in the process of demonstrating the need to formulate such a justification, we choose the derivative conception of legal interpretation, which provides for the duty to justify interpretive claims for methodological reasons (and which is an intrinsic element of the content of legal directives in this conception, at least implicitly). We present and discuss the types of justifications for interpretive claims and their variants (weak and strong). Furthermore, we analyse the difference between justifying ordinary and interpretive claims. Finally, we also identify the consequences of failure to provide such justifications.

Keywords: justification of interpretive claim, legal interpretation, postulate of criticism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 7-18.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.7

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Number of downloads: 752

Legal Reasoning as Practical Reasoning in John M. Finnis’ New Natural Law Theory

Mgr Michał Sopiński

University of Warsaw

English abstract: This paper presents practical reasoning in the light of John M. Finnis’ new natural law theory. Finnis’ views were shaped by Aquinas’ thoughts on natural law but he was also strongly inspired by Germain Grisez’ new approach, so his theory could be named a new natural law theory. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of legal reasoning as practical reasoning, which Finnis intended mainly as a strong critique of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of legal reasoning based on the concept of the one right answer. According to the author of this paper, Finnis’ critical approach to Dworkin leads to a gradual extension of the former’s concept of legal reasoning to include positivistic aspects (rapprochement with Joseph Raz’ views) and institutional aspects (rapprochement with Neil MacCormick’s views). Therefore, Finnis’ theory of legal reasoning seems to be a model example of the rapprochement between natural law and legal positivism in contemporary philosophy of law.

Keywords: John M. Finnis, natural law, legal reasoning, practical reasoning, Ronald Dworkin, one right answer

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(21)/2020, pp. 84-98.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.84

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Number of downloads: 824

Should a Court Be Understanding for the Legislator? On Legislative Error from the Perspective of the Theory of Legal Interpretation

Mgr Marek Suska

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: In the actual legislative processes, errors are often made: the legislator’s intentions are not always properly expressed in the legal provisions or there is insufficient clarity. The discrepancy between what the legislator said and what they meant to say poses a serious challenge to the theory and practice of legal interpretation. In this paper, the author analyses two possible reactions to a legislative error: correcting it or applying the provision in its literal meaning. The considerations are based on two decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, because in criminal law the protection of the prima facie understanding of the text is a very important value. In the final part of the paper, the author indicates factors which can affect the court’s attitude towards a legislative error in a specific case.

Keywords: legislative error, scrivener’s error, legal interpretation, law-making

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 99-110.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.99

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Number of downloads: 748

Narrativity of Legal Language in Law-Making Processes

Dr Paweł Skuczyński

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The paper concerns the relation between argumentative and narrative features of legal texts and the question whether legal texts can be perceived as narrative texts. A narrative text is understood as transferring a story to the recipient through a given medium. The story, being the content of a narrative text, constitutes a specific way of manifesting the plot. The latter is a sort of internal logic of the story. The very same plot might be told in many different ways. Hence, the narrative text does not depict events directly, but through a story that requires a storytelling agent – the narrator. Certainly, there are different kinds of narrators, who can be more or less exposed within the text. In consequence, there are at least five positions concerning the relation between argumentation and narration in law: 1) sceptic – narration is a negation of the reasonableness of law; 2) narration is a structure of presentation of facts; 3) narration is a means of rhetoric persuasion; 4) narration is a meta-argumentative structure; 5) narration is a subject of critical analysis as it reveals the identity of an author. The theory of narration is applied to a particular problem of participation of professional self-governments in law-making.

Keywords: legal narrative, legal argumentation, legal language, law-making, professional self-governments

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 66-83.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.66ENG

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Number of downloads: 369

David DeGrazia on Animal Rights: A Critical Analysis

Dr Michał Pełka

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The article aims to critically discuss the theory of animal rights developed by American social philosopher David DeGrazia. It consists of two parts. The first one describes the main elements of DeGrazia’s approach, namely his views on animal minds, the principle of equal consideration, the idea of unequal moral status, the concept of border persons, and practical remarks concerning improving the treatment of animals by humans. The second part presents remarks about the points where DeGrazia’s proposals should be supplemented and corrected so as to make them more convincing and widely accepted. The conclusion of the essay is the proposal of a cultural revolution for the benefit of animals, which should be initiated by famous people, like actresses, actors, sportswomen and sportsmen, because of their influential position in contemporary societies.

Keywords: border persons, animal rights, cultural revolution, moral status, equal consideration principle, David DeGrazia

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 52-65.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.52ENG

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Number of downloads: 521

Lord Patrick Devlin’s Concept of Public Morality in the Light of Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights

Mgr Kamil Jesiołowski

University of Business and Administration in Gdynia

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in cases concerning public morality, in the context of one of the most important debates in 20th century legal philosophy: the dispute between Patrick Devlin and Herbert L.A. Hart. In order to achieve this aim, I first describe the key theses defended by these scholars and explain the historical circumstances in which the debate arose. Then I analyse the most salient judgements passed by the ECtHR, which defined rules of the acceptable limitation of individual rights guaranteed by the European Human Rights Convention due to the moral norms existing in a society. I conclude that the reasoning adopted by the ECtHR in these cases resembles Devlin’s propositions to some extent. Furthermore, I claim that a reference to inherent and inalienable human dignity might be considered a sound solution in some doubtful cases in which moral problems or rights restrictions appear. Finally, I show that legal moralism, as a vein in the philosophy of law, has its adherents in contemporary science, too. However, the views presented by new legal moralists fundamentally differ from those postulated by Patrick Devlin in his time.

Keywords: Devlin, Hart, legal moralism, ECtHR judgments

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 37-51.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.37

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Number of downloads: 813

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