Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Search Results for: jurisprudence Language: English

Karol Dobrzeniecki, “Law on Emergency Situations. Between Legalism and Necessity”. A Review

Dr hab. Arkadiusz Barut

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The subject of the review is a monograph by Karol Dobrzeniecki “Law on emergency situations. Between legalism and necessity” (Toruń 2018). According to the reviewer, the nature of the work determines the distinction between an emergency situation, that is, a factual state requiring action not provided for by law and a state of emergency, i.e. a legal institution. The main purpose of the work is to analyze the relationship between the recognition of an exceptional situation only in legal terms, and its approach as a political and moral issue. The work has interdisciplinary character. Karol Dobrzeniecki, analyzing jurisprudence, political philosophical, doctrine of constitutional law, as well as constitutional, international and supranational legal regulations, points out the danger of legal “normalization” of a state of emergency, that is, the penetration of its specific solutions into the law intended for the ordinary situation, and hence blurring of the distinction between ordinary and exceptional situations. The author of the reviewed monograph believes that the exceptional situation should be assessed primarily in moral and political categories, being aware of the tragic nature of the choices made at the time.

Keywords: emergency situation, state of emergency

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 121-125.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.121

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Number of downloads: 721

Filed Under: Reviews and discussions Tagged With: emergency situation, state of emergency

Judges’ Virtues and Vices: Outline of a Research Agenda for Legal Theory

Prof. UG dr hab. Tomasz Widłak

University of Gdańsk

Abstract: This article focuses on the issue of applicability of virtue theory to legal theory in civil-law (statutory) jurisdictions and suggests research areas and problems in that respect. The author starts with an assumption that the notion of “virtue” and virtue ethics should be used for the purposes of legal theory starting from references to judicial ethics and normative theory of judicial decision-making. This approach looks especially promising for the purpose of systematizing the chaotic moral language that is being currently used in Poland in reference to judges, their skills, and qualities of their character, which in turn may lead to formulating an explanatory and normative theory of the judicial role that better addresses the observable deficiencies of legal deontology. The author suggests research that could proceed from interpretatively uncovering what are believed to be specific judicial virtues and vices, considering different aspects of the wider Polish and European legal culture of civil law countries (included but not limited to legal and ethical standards, public discourse, legal and other literature, historical and fictional examples, and role models). With respect to judicial ethics, existing virtue theories, including non-eudaimonistic ones, may be examined for the purpose of identifying the model of virtue best suited to the particular nature of the judicial profession. The aretaic (rather than deontological or consequentialist) perspective may enable legal scholarship to take a new path in the debate on the status and qualities of the judiciary, including the problems relating to judicial independence and the selection of candidates for judicial offices.

Keywords: virtue, virtue ethics, aretaic theory, judicial virtues, juristic virtues, virtue jurisprudence, judicial character

Language: English

Received: 31.05.2019
Accepted:
02.12.2019

Published: Number 2(20)/2019, pp. 51-62.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2019.2.51

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Number of downloads: 871

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: aretaic theory, judicial character, judicial virtues, juristic virtues, Tomasz Widłak, virtue, virtue ethics, virtue jurisprudence

Monocentrism and Multicentrism as Legal Theories in the Global Era

Prof. dr hab. Tadeusz Buksiński

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The article describes two opposing theories of legislation and jurisprudence in the global age: multicentrism and monocentrism. The first one claims that a new legal system at the supra-state level is emerging, which must take into consideration varied legal traditions. The second one stresses that certain fundamental principles must be shared today by all people. It seems that the ultimate goal of jurisprudence is to create a system of laws that reconciles multitude and diversity with unity.

Keywords: multicentrism, monocentrism, theory of legislation

Language: English

Published: Number 1(10)/2015, pp. 5-13

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2015.1.5

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Number of downloads:
689

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: monocentrism, multicentrism, theory of legislation

A short history of the British Critical Legal Conference or the responsibility of the critic

Prof. dr Costas Douzinas

Birkbeck, University of London

English abstract: General jurisprudence is a type of thinking about law and the social bond developed by British critical legal scholars. Returning to the classical concerns of (legal) philosophy, it examines the legal aspects of social reproduction both inside and outside state law, treating posited law as a part of wider legality. It brings back to the centre the aesthetic, ethical and material aspects of legality, as well as includes the political economy of law, the legal constructions of subjectivity and the ways in which gender, race or sexuality create forms of identity both disciplining bodies and offering sites of resistance. The British Critical Legal Conference (CLC) is a school of thought committed to a plurality of theoretical approaches to law and to radical politics. The first CLC took place in 1985 and has taken place annually without interruption since. The CLC has introduced a number of themes, approaches and strategies unknown or dismissed by mainstream scholarship, including semiotics, rhetoric, literature, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. A variety of critical schools, such as postmodernism, phenomenology, postcolonialism, critical race, feminism, queer theory, art theory and history, the ethics of otherness, the ontology of plural singularity, the critique of biopolitics and post–politics have been pioneered in the CLC.

Keywords: Critical Legal Studies, aesthetics, ethics, British Critical Legal Conference

Language: Polish
Translated by: Rafał Mańko

Published: Number 1(8)/2014, pp. 5-17

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Number of downloads: 424

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: aesthetics, British Critical Legal Conference, Critical Legal Studies, ethics

Does every culture deserves a defence? Few queries concerning cultural defence and criminal law in the age of multiculturalism

Mgr Michał Dudek

Jagiellonian University


English abstract:
The aim of the article is to indicate some of the axiological problems faced by the legislator in the law-making process. They are clearly visible in those legal regulations that are introduced in response to crisis situations. The presented example – terrorist attack by hijacking a plane – is not only used to demonstrate dilemmas which in this situation must be settled by the legislator preparing relevant legal provisions, but it is also a pretext for enriching the discussion on the axiological aspect of the law. The article focuses on the so-called natural helplessness of law in axiological matters, law inflation and the problem of responsibility. The author concludes that issues indicated in the article cannot be solved in the light of current Constitutional Court’s judgements, which are treated as a reference point of the discussed issues.

Keywords: cultural defence, multiculturalism, ethnocentrism, militant ethnocentrism, criminal law, minority rights

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(3)/2011, pp. 47-60.

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Number of downloads:
616

References:

  1. Appadurai A., Strach przed mniejszościami. Esej o geografii gniewu, tłum. M. Bucholc, Warszawa 2009 
  2. Arjona C., Truffin B.,  The Cultural Defence in Spain, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D.  (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  3. Bronitt S., Visions of a Multicultural Criminal Law: an Australian Perspective, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D.  (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  4. Carstens P.A., The Cultural Defence in Criminal Law: South African Perspectives, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D.  (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  5. Chiu E.M., Culture as Justification, not Excuse, St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0043 
  6. Coleman D.L., Individualizing Justice through Multiculturalism: the Liberal’s Dilemma, “Columbia Law Review” 1996, t. 96, nr 5 
  7. Deckha M., The Paradox of the Cultural Defence: Gender and Cultural Othering in Canada, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D.  (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  8. Donovan M., Garth J.S., Delimiting the Culture Defense, “Quinnipiac Law Review” 2007 
  9. Eisenberg A., Spinner-Halev J., Introduction, w: Eisenberg A., Spinner-Halev J.  (red.), Minorities within Minorities. Equality, Rights and Diversity, Cambridge 2005 
  10. Fish S., Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals Are Incapable of Thinking about Hate Speech, “Critical Inquiry” 1997, t. 23 
  11. Fontaine R.G., Held E.M., On the Boundaries of Culture as an Affirmative Defense, “Arizona Law Review” 2009 
  12. Gierszewski Z., Kultura – moralność – względność. Doktryna relatywizmu kulturowego M.J. Herskovitsa, Poznań 2000 
  13. Gryniuk A., Prawo jako forma techniki społecznej i jego funkcje, w: Polkowska G. (red.), Prawo i ład społeczny. Księga pamiątkowa dedykowana Profesor Annie Turskiej, Warszawa 2000 
  14. Kaczmarek P., Pytanie o użyteczność perspektywy (etno)centrycznej dla rozważań nad prawem, Błachut M. (red.), Z zagadnień teorii i filozofii prawa. Ponowoczesność, Wrocław 2007 
  15. Kojder A., Godność i siła prawa, Warszawa 2001 
  16. Maier S., Honor Killings and the Cultural Defense in Germany, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D. (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  17. Merle J.-Ch., Cultural Defence, Hate Crimes and Equality Before the Law, “Ethic@” 2006, t. 5, nr 1 
  18. Morawski L., Główne problemy współczesnej filozofii prawa. Prawo w toku przemian, Warszawa 2005
  19. Oude Breuil B.C., Dealing with Ethnic Order in Criminal Law in Practice: a Case Study from the Netherlands, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D. (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  20. Paleczny T., Stosunki międzykulturowe: modele pluralizmu w społeczeństwach „ponowoczesnych”, w: Golemo K., Paleczny T., Wiącek E. (red.), Wzory wielokulturowości we współczesnym świecie, Kraków 2006 
  21. Phillips A., Multiculturalism without Culture, Princeton 2009 
  22. Renteln A.D., The Cultural Defense, Nowy Jork 2004 
  23. Renteln A.D., The cultural defense: Challenging the monocultural paradigm, w: Foblets M.-C., Gaudreault-Desbiens J.-F., Renteln A.D. (red.), Cultural Diversity and the Law: State Responses from Around the World, Bruksela 2010 
  24. Rokicki J., O realności i złudzeniu „globalizacji”, „wielokulturowości” i „ponowoczesności”, w: Golemo K., Paleczny T., Wiącek E.  (red.), Wzory wielokulturowości we współczesnym świecie, Kraków 2006 
  25. Shachar A., Multicultural Jurisdictions. Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, Cambridge 2001 
  26. Siesling M., Ten Voorde J., The Paradox of Cultural Differences in Dutch Criminal Law, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D. (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  27. Sitarz O., Culture defence a polskie prawo karne, „Archiwum Kryminologii” 2007–2008/ t. XXIX–XXX 
  28. Sulikowski A., Współczesny paradygmat sądownictwa konstytucyjnego wobec kryzysu nowoczesności, Wrocław 2008 
  29. Szahaj A., E pluribus unum? Dylematy wielokulturowości i politycznej poprawności, Kraków 2010 
  30. Warmińska K., Pamięć społeczna w walce o uznanie w społeczeństwie wielokulturowym, w: Golemo K., Paleczny T., Wiącek E. (red.), Wzory wielokulturowości we współczesnym świecie, Kraków 2006 
  31. Wojciechowski B., Interkulturowe prawo karne. Filozoficzne podstawy karania w wielokulturowych społeczeństwach demokratycznych, Toruń 2009 
  32. Woodman G.R., The Culture Defence in English Common Law: the Potential for Development, w: Foblets M.-C., Renteln A.D.  (red.), Multicultural Jurisprudence. Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense, Portland 2009 
  33. Zajadło J., Kontrowersje wokół tzw. obrony przez kulturę – okoliczność wyłączająca winę, okoliczność łagodząca czy nadużycie prawa do obrony, „Przegląd Sądowy” 2007/6 
  34. Zajadło J., Moua zniewala Xeng Xiong, w: J. Zajadło (red.), Fascynujące ścieżki filozofii prawa, Warszawa 2008 
  35. Zajadło J., Po co prawnikom filozofia prawa?, Warszawa 2008 
  36. Zajadło J., Uniwersalizm praw człowieka w konstytucji – bezpieczne i niebezpieczne relatywizacje, „Przegląd Sejmowy” 2007/4 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: criminal law, cultural defence, ethnocentrism, Michał Dudek, militant ethnocentrism, minority rights, multiculturalism

The law as a border in life of a man and states

Dr Dawid Bunikowski

WSB University in Toruń


English abstract:
The law as a border concerns both acts of man and the power and a territory of a state. The law as a border is a social institution more sophisticated than it seems to be in traditional concept of legal positivism and Austin’s point of view. In the state law there are many borders (in criminal law, civil law, administrative law, procedural law relating to terms, freedoms and rights, obligations, going to court, and on the other hand, competences/authorities of public offices etc.). In a narrow sense the law as a border is the state law, which establishes borders of human act and behavior through the sphere of legally allowed, forbidden and ordered acts creating institutionalized legal sanctions for the break of the border and non-respect for legal norms. In a wide sense the law as a border is also mine – „my” law, “internal” law (Petrazycki’s psychological theory of law), making one’s the rules of behavior and relating to the state law (the law as a border in a narrow sense) in many ways. Customary law (also religious law) and international law are very specific branches of the law. I maintain that the law as a border must be supported by other normative systems such as morality, religion etc.

Keywords: law as a border, state law, normative systems

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(3)/2011, pp. 20-33.

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Number of downloads:
416

References:

  1. Allard L.C. i in., Cross-Border Relocation Law, Canada 2002 
  2. Austin J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, w: The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1998 
  3. Borucka-Arctowa M. (red.), Społeczne poglądy na funkcje prawa, Wrocław 1982 
  4. Bunikowski D., Podstawowe kontrowersje dotyczące ingerencji prawa w sferę moralności, Toruń 2010. 
  5. Dellapenna W., Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History, Durham, North Carolina 2006 
  6. Johnson D.R., Post D.G., Law And Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stanford Law Review 1996/1367 
  7. Kępiński J. (red. tomu), Kepiński M. (red. serii), Klafkowska-Waśniowska K., Sikorski R., Granice prawa autorskiego, Warszawa 2010 
  8. Lang W., Wróblewski J., Zawadzki S., Teoria państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1986 
  9. Pałecki K., Społeczne opinie o prawie i jego sądowym stosowaniu w dziedzinie stosunków rodzinnych, w: M. Borucka-Arctowa (red.), Poglądy społeczeństwa polskiego na stosowanie prawa, Wrocław–Kraków–Warszawa–Gdańsk 1978 
  10. Pałecki K., Uwagi o koncepcji „granica prawa” Roscoe Pounda, „Zeszyty Naukowe UJ” 1984/20 
  11. Pałecki K., Uwagi o koncepcji granic prawa, w: Idee–Państwo–Prawo, J. Majchrowski (red.),”Zeszyty Naukowe UJ. Prace z Nauk Politycznych” 1991/28 
  12. Pałecki K., Warianty oddziaływania prawem na stosunki rodzinne, w: J. Kurczewski (red.), Prawo w społeczeństwie, Warszawa 1975 
  13. Petrażycki L., Wstęp do nauki polityki prawa, Warszawa 1968 
  14. Petrażycki L., O nauce, prawie i moralności. Pisma wybrane, Warszawa 1985 
  15. Spyra T., Granice wykładni prawa. Znaczenie językowe tekstu prawnego jako granica wykładni, Warszawa 2006 
  16. Wróblewski J., Nieostrość systemu prawa, „Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne” 1983 (rok wyd. 1985), t. XXXI 
  17. Wróblewski J., Prawo a homeostaza społeczna, „Państwo i Prawo” 1982/12 

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Dawid Bunikowski, law as a border, normative systems, state law

The ‘clarification’ theory of legal interpretation as a theory of justification. Psycholinguistic perspective and the positivist idea of legal interpretation

Mgr Marcin Romanowicz

University of Warsaw


English abstract:
Within the framework of legal positivism on the ground of Polish legal theory there was founded, in the scope of the issue of legal interpretation, the ‘clarification’ theory, formulated by J. Wróblewski. Adopting psycholinguistic perspective for the analysis of above mentioned theory allows to take the knowledge about human linguistic cognition into consideration and compare it with the vision of achieving understanding of legal text as understood by J. Wróblewski. Thus conducted “mental experiment” – moving from the level of the legal theory to the level of psycholinguistics – reveals “hidden” properties of J. Wróblewski theory of legal interpretation. First of all, as far as the question about the status of his theory is concerned, it allows to formulate a conclusion that it is neither a descriptive nor a normative theory of legal interpretation. It is possible to accept only as a normative theory of justification of interpretation decisions in the process of law application.

Keywords: Jerzy Wróblewski, ‘clarification’ theory of legal interpretation, psycholinguistics (keywords supplied by the editors)

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 55-74.

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Number of downloads:
718

References:

  1. Alexy R., The Argument from Injustice. A Reply to Legal Positivism, Oxford 2002.
  2. Barankiewicz T., Inkluzywny pozytywizm prawniczy. Geneza, rozwój, główne idee, „Państwo i Prawo” 2010/1.
  3. Broekman J.M., Minimalna zawartość pozytywizmu. Pozytywizm w prawie i w teorii prawa, „Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne”, 1987/XXXVIII.
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  5. Chauvin T., Stawecki T., Winczorek P., Wstęp do prawoznawstwa, Warszawa 2009
  6. Choduń A., Czepita S., (red.), W poszukiwaniu dobra wspólnego. Księga Jubileuszowa Profesora Macieja Zielińskiego, Szczecin 2010.
  7. Coleman J.L., Shapiro S. (red.), Oxford Handbook Of Jurisprudence And Philosophy Of Law, Oxford 2002.
  8. Dworkin R., Imperium prawa, Warszawa 2006.
  9. Dybowski K., Johna Austina filozofia prawa, Toruń 1991.
  10. Dyrda A., Argument „semantycznego ukąszenia” a teoria prawa Jerzego Wróblewskiego, „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” 2010/1.
  11. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Dyrektywy wykładni drugiego stopnia, w: Choduń A., Czepita S., (red.), W poszukiwaniu dobra wspólnego. Księga Jubileuszowa Profesora Macieja Zielińskiego, Szczecin 2010.
  12. Grabowski A., Prawnicze pojęcie obowiązywania prawa stanowionego. Krytyka niepozytywistycznej koncepcji prawa, Kraków 2009.
  13. Hart H.L.A., Pojęcie prawa, Warszawa 1998.
  14. Himma K.E., Inclusive Legal Positivism, w: J.L. Coleman, S. Shapiro (red.), Oxford Handbook Of Jurisprudence And Philosophy Of Law, Oxford 2002.
  15. Holocher J., Kontekst odkrycia i kontekst uzasadnienia w świetle topicznej koncepcji prawa, „Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne” 2009/LXXX.
  16. Kurcz I., Język i komunikacja, w: Strelau J., (red.), Psychologia. Podręcznik akademicki, Gdańsk 2004, t. II.
  17. Kurcz I., Polkowska A., Interakcyjne i autonomiczne przetwarzanie informacji językowej na przykładzie procesu rozumienia tekstu czytanego na głos, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1990
  18. Lakatos I., The methodology of scientific research programmes, Nowy Jork 1978.
  19. Lang W., Wróblewski J., Zawadzki S., Teoria państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1986.
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  32. Płeszka K., Reguły preferencji w prawniczych rozumowaniach interpretacyjnych w: Stelmach J. (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2003
  33. Popper K., Logika odkrycia naukowego, Warszawa 2006.
  34. Raz J., Incorporation by Law, w: A. Marmor, Between Authority and Interpretation, Oxford 2009.
  35. Romanowicz M., Przełomowe pytanie: cóż to jest nauka? w: „Sylwestrowe Warsztaty Naukowe”, Warszawa 2008.
  36. Romanowicz M., Wykładnia prawa w polskiej myśli prawnej – spór kluczowych teorii i próba opisu zjawiska, „Przegląd Prawniczy Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego” 2010/1–2
  37. Stelmach J. (red.), Studia z filozofii prawa, Kraków 2000.
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  44. Wróblewski J., Problems Related to the One Right Answer Thesis, „Ratio Juris” 1989/3
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Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: ‘clarification’ theory of legal interpretation, Jerzy Wróblewski, Marcin Romanowicz, psycholinguistics

Utility and Wealth-Maximisation: The Philosophical Foundations of the Chicago School of Law and Economics

Dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University


English abstract:
The article discusses the philosophical rootedness of the economic analysis of law. Utilitarianism is identified as the main source of inspiration for the law and economics movement. A brief account of the most important issues that utilitarianism raises is given. A detailed analysis of the complex relationship between utilitarianism and wealth-maximisation is carried out. The affinities and the differences between the two standpoints are specified. The main disparity, i.e. the status of both maximisation precepts is highlighted. The incoherence of R. Posner’s position including his pragmatic argument for wealth maximisation and his commitment to the thesis about ethical convergence is pointed out.

Keywords: economic analysis of law, ethic of productivity, wealth-maximization, pragmatic decision procedure, teleological theory, utilitarianism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 5-14.

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Number of downloads:
389

References:

  1. Brink D., Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View, „Journal of Philosophy” 1986/8.
  2. Cooter R., Ulen T., Law and Economics, Boston 2004.
  3. Dworkin R., Biorąc prawa poważnie, Warszawa 1998.
  4. Kymlicka W., Współczesna filozofia polityczna, Kraków 1998.
  5. Lukes S., Niezwykłe oświecenie profesora Caritata, Warszawa 2003.
  6. Nozick R., Anarchia, państwo, utopia, Warszawa 1999.
  7. Parfit D., Reasons and Persons, Oxford-New York 1986.
  8. Polanowska-Sygulska B., Between Utility and Wealth-Maximization, w: Stelmach J., Brożek B., Załuski W. (red.), Studies in the Philosophy of Law: Frontiers of the Economic Analysis of Law, Kraków 2007.
  9. Posner R., Overcoming Law, Cambridge (Mass.)-London 2002.
  10. Posner R., The Problems of Jurisprudence, Cambridge (Mass.)-London 1990.
  11. Rawls J., Teoria sprawiedliwości, Warszawa 1994.
  12. Smart J.J.C., Williams B., Utilitarianism: For & Against, Cambridge 1973.
  13. Stelmach J., Brożek B., Metody prawnicze, Kraków 2004.
  14. Stelmach J., Brożek B., Załuski W. (red.), Studies in the Philosophy of Law: Frontiers of the Economic Analysis of Law, Kraków 2007.
  15. Stelmach J., Sarkowicz R., Filozofia prawa XIX i XX wieku, Kraków 1998.
  16. Williams B., Moral Luck. Philosophical Papers 1973–1980, Cambridge 1986.
  17. Williams B., Moralność. Wprowadzenie do etyki, Warszawa 2000.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

“The Semantic Sting” Argument and Jerzy Wróblewski’s Theory of Law

Mgr Adam Dyrda

Jagiellonian University


English abstract:
Ronald Dworkin once criticized legal positivists for that their theories are founded on a mistake called “the semantic sting”, which claims that legal philosophy, as a silent prologue to every decision of law, cannot be only a semantic account to the word ‘law’. The article presents Dworkinean argument (and its most influential critique of Herbert Hart) and examines whether Jerzy Wróblewski’s legal theory (in its descriptive layer similar to the theory of Herbert Hart) is susceptible to “the semantic sting”. Finally, the answer given is based on a particular solution: Jerzy Wróblewski’s concept of rationality of legal decision appliance. The answer is in accoradance with argumentation of soft positivists, such as Herbert Hart or Jules Coleman, and is based on the acceptance that, even if Dworkin’s argument is meaningfull, it still does not apply to the theories presented by the soft positivists. The controversy whether a particular theory is “semantically stung” is de facto a dispute over a proper methodological approach to legal theory and a relation in which such a theory remains to interpretative jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. In this case we can treat Jerzy Wróblewski’s theory as a metatheory, which deals with theoretic disagreement over the grounds of the law, while deciding the case.

Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, Herbert Hart, Jerzy Wróblewski, semantic sting, legal positivism, rational application of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 39-47.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads:
663

References:

  1. Coleman J. (red.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Oxford 2001.
  2. Coleman J., Methodology, w: Coleman J., Shapiro S. (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford 2002.
  3. Coleman J., The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory, Oxford 2001.
  4. Coleman J., Shapiro S. (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford 2002.
  5. Davidson D., Preface, w: LePore E., McLaughlin B.P., Actions and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford 1985.
  6. Dworkin R., Imperium prawa, Warszawa 2006.
  7. Gizbert-Studnicki T., Zasady i reguły prawne, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
  8. Hart H.L.A., Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, Oxford 1953.
  9. Hart H.L.A., Pojęcie prawa, Warszawa 1998.
  10. LePore E., McLaughlin B.P., Actions and Events. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford 1985.
  11. MacCormick N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, Oxford 1978.
  12. Raz J., Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, w: Coleman J. (red.), Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Oxford 2001.
  13. Shapiro S., What is Law? (And Why Should We Care?), 1st Conference On Philosophy And Law Neutrality And Theory Of Law, Girona, 20-22.05.2010
  14. Wróblewski J., Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire, „Państwo i Prawo” 1988/3.
  15. Wróblewski J., Rozumienie prawa i jego wykładnia, Wrocław 1990.
  16. Wróblewski J., Sądowe stosowanie prawa, Warszawa 1972.
  17. Wróblewski J., Zagadnienia teorii wykładni prawa ludowego, Warszawa 1959.
  18. Zabala S., The hermeneutic nature of analytic philosophy: a study of Ernst Tugendhat, New York 2008.
  19. Zirk-Sadowski M., Wprowadzenie, w: Dworkin R., Imperium prawa, Warszawa 2006.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: Adam Dyrda, Herbert Hart, Jerzy Wróblewski, legal positivism, rational application of law, Ronald Dworkin, semantic sting

What is Law? Aims and Means

Prof. Dr. Dietmar von der Pfordten

University of Göttingen


English abstract:
This article is an attempt at delimiting the area of philosophical research in order to define the conditions for an adequate definition of the law. This writer believes that this definition is achieved by identifying the particular aims and means which are set for the law and through which the social phenomenon of the law is realized. Assumedly, the definition is to be a response to the so-called normativism in the theory of law, that is, an attempt to explain the notion through the particular means (norms) used by the law. The writer tries to justify not only that his approach characterizes the law more fully, but also that it contributes to better understanding of the links between law and ethics, morality, politics or the remaining conventional social facts.

Keywords: definition of the law, aims and means of the law, law and ethics, law and conventional social facts (keywords supplied by the editors)

Language: Polish
Translatad by: Mateusz Klinowski

Published: Number 1(1)/2010, pp. 7-18.

Download file: Download

Number of downloads:
742

References:

  1. Arystoteles, Etyka Nikomachejska.
  2. Arystoteles, Polityka.
  3. Austin J., The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge 1995.
  4. Bentham J., The Principles of Morals and Legislation, Buffalo (N.Y.) 1988.
  5. Cicero, De Legibus.
  6. Dworkin R., Taking Rights Seriously, London 1977.
  7. Dworkin R., Law’s Empire, Cambridge 1986
  8. Hart H.L.A., The Concept of Law, Oxford 1961.
  9. Hegel G.W.F., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. W: E. Moldenhauer, K.M. Michel (red.), Werke, Vol. 7, Frankfurt am Main 1970.
  10. Hobbes T., Lewiatan, Cambridge 1991.
  11. von Jhering R., Der Zweck im Recht, Leipzig 1893.
  12. Kant I., Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Edited by the Prussian Akademie, Vol. III, Berlin 1904.
  13. Kant I., Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre, Berlin 1907.
  14. Kelsen H., Reine Rechtslehre. Wiedeń 1960.
  15. Locke J., Second Treatise on Government, Raleigh (N.C.) 1991.
  16. von der Pfordten D., Deskription, Evaluation, Präskription, Berlin 1993.
  17. von der Pfordten D., Rechtsethik, München 2001.
  18. von der Pfordten D., Was ist und Wozu Rechtsphilosophie?. “Juristenzeitung” 2004/59, 157-166.
  19. Platon, Laches.
  20. Platon, Państwo.
  21. Radbruch G., Rechtsphilosophie, Heidelberg 2003.
  22. Raz J., Legal Positivism and the Sources of Law, w: Raz J., The Authority of Law, Oxford 1979.
  23. Ross A., Tû-Tû, “Harvard Law Review” 1956-57/70, 812-825.
  24. Schopenhauer A., Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Darmstadt 1961.
  25. Tomasz z Akwinu, Summa Theologiae.
  26. Wittgenstein L., Tractatus logico-philsophicus, Frankfurt am Main 1995.

Filed Under: Articles Tagged With: aims means of the law, definition of the law, Dietmar von der Pfordten, law and conventional social facts, law and ethics

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