Search Results for: community

The European Union as a Community of Well-Ordered Peoples? Object-Oriented Interpretation of John Rawls’ Law of Peoples. A Contribution to Future Research

Michał Kordziński

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: This article aims to present an interpretative perspective on the concept of the law of peoples, enabling its contemporary conceptualization. According to the main research thesis of the article, the concepts of the object-oriented programming paradigm provide an effective conceptual apparatus for reinterpreting philosophical claims, which, in particular, can be applied to contemporary conceptualization of John Rawls’ law of peoples. In the first part of the article, the relationships between the object-oriented programming paradigm and philosophy in three areas are specified and described: the philosophy of computer science, the philosophy of science, and computational philosophy. The next part presents the key mechanisms of the object-oriented programming paradigm, such as class-object and inheritance. In turn, the third part shows how selected articles of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Geneva Conventions flesh out the principles of justice specified in the law of peoples. On this basis, the conclusion is drawn that they are related to each other by the relationship of inheritance. In the fourth part, the emergent structure is subjected to object-oriented interpretation, resulting in the recognition of the law of peoples as an unspecified class.

Keywords: law of peoples, object-oriented programming paradigm, object-oriented interpretation

Language: Polish

Published: nr 3(40)/2024, pp. 16-26.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.3.16

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Number of downloads: 244

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Normative and Situationist Conception of General Clause of the Principles of Community Coexistence

Prof. dr hab. Józef NOWACKI (1923–2005)

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: Polish law uses the general clause of the principles of community coexistence. In the legal literature, the concept of principles of social coexistence is understood in various ways. Some people understand the principles of social coexistence in a normative way, associating with them a set of norms to which these clauses refer. Others perceive them situationistically, which means the right to make an assessment in a particular case under consideration. The author argues that the source of controversy in this regard is the unconscious adoption of different understandings of morality. Due to this, the use of each of these understandings (normative and situationist) is legitimate in equall way. For this reason, disputes about the normative and situationist understanding of the principles of social coexistence are empirically unsolvable.

Keywords: Józef Nowacki, general clause, situationalist and normativist conception, the principles of community co-existence

Language: Polish

Published: Number 3(36)/2023, s. 9-21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2023.3.9

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Number of downloads: 410

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The Crisis of Dialogue and Political Community: Philosophical Reflections on the Relationship Between Pluralism, Difference and Dialogue

Dr hab. Anna Rossmanith

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The aim of this article is to present the relationship between pluralism, difference and dialogue as the foundation of an open society. The fundamental philosophical perspective of the study is centred around unique Levinas’ ethics. According to Levinas, we can see a difference as a creative component of a community and therefore abandon the ontological notion of the world understood as a whole and totality. In the undertaken considerations, the author refers to categories such as polis, deliberative democracy and external morality of law.

Keywords: dialogue, political community, polis, pluralism, difference, communication, open society

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(30)/2022, pp. 91-99

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.1.91

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Number of downloads: 449

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From Person to Community. The Theory of Participation According to Karol Wojtyła

Dr Wojciech Wojtyła

Kazimierz Pułaski University of Technology and Humanities in Radom

English abstract: The article shows the category of participation as the key, proposed by Karol Wojtyła, to understanding the person-community relationship. The philosopher from Kraków argues that a person fully reveals themselves as a personal being only when they work together with others on the foundation of participation. The capacity for subjective participation, which forms part of the very structure of a person, both determines a personalistic nature of the acts performed by the person, and also enables them to fulfil themselves in relation to others. For Wojtyła, participation is the antithesis of alienation, and its affirmation enables overcoming both the antinomy between the individual and the community, and the one-sided concepts of individualism and collectivism.

Keywords: subject, society, self-agency, self-realization

Language: Polish

Published: Number 4(25)/2020, pp. 103-117.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.4.103

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Number of downloads: 668

No Thoughts Barred: In Defence of (Nearly) Absolute Academic Freedom

Mgr Przemysław Rybiński

University of Wrocław

English abstract: There is no agreement as to whether academic freedom is a variation (perhaps a subset) of freedom of speech – which is individual in its character and which governs a person’s relations with other persons and with the state – or a cluster of rules unlike freedom of speech, which has a different origin and which is enjoyed by the academic community as a whole. Irrespective of which of these claims is true, some concepts that originated in US case law on the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may well be imported to the discourse on the scope of academic freedom held within the civil law tradition. In light of both the functionalist and natural law positions on the nature of freedom of speech, this article argues three points about the normative environment of academia: first, academic freedom (freedom of research, freedom of teaching) is rooted in natural human curiosity and urge to communicate; second, the error-correcting features of the scientific method are consistent with self-correcting features observed in static normative systems such as systems of professional ethics in professions of public trust; third, any normative environment of the academia must conform with the notions of content neutrality and a marketplace of ideas. These points suggest that academic freedom cannot be subject to limitations, whether external (relating to law, scoring systems or funding) or internal (relating to non-merit based themes of discourse).

Key words: freedom of speech, academic freedom, content neutrality, marketplace of ideas, ethics

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 112–124.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.112

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On Academic Freedom. Commentary on Ronald Dworkin’s Approach

Dr Paweł Jabłoński

University of Wrocław

English abstract: Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: Ronald Dworkin, academic freedom, freedom of speech, academic teacher, culture of independence

Language: polish

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 96–111.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.96

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Number of downloads: 218,849

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Academic Freedom on the Frontlines of Culture Wars: Stanley Fish and the Freedom of Expression of a University Teacher

Dr Jakub Łakomy

University of Wrocław

English abstract:Academic freedom of expression today is caught in the crossfire of many intense culture wars. Traditional liberal defences of free expression and freedom of speech seem to be insufficient. This paper argues that we need a fresh theoretical lens to understand and solve these conflictual situations in which university teachers often find themselves. Adopting an analytical and philosophical approach grounded in legal theory, my paper uses Stanley Fish’s neopragmatist, anti-foundationalist framework to reconceptualize academic freedom of expression. The central thesis of my article is that academic freedom is not an absolute individual right to say anything one pleases but a context-bound freedom defined by academia’s internal norms and purposes. In contrast to liberal theories that invoke universal principles, such as Mill’s “marketplace of ideas” or broad “First Amendment” rights, Fish’s perspective insists that all speech is constrained by its interpretive community. This paper critically evaluates liberal justifications for free academic expression, showing how these rely on abstract foundations that Fish’s neopragmatism calls into question; it reconstructs a Fishian account of academic freedom based on “professional correctness,” the idea that scholars are free only to the extent that their different forms of expression are coherent with the specific professional objectives and standards of scholarly inquiry.

Key words: academic freedom, freedom of expression, culture wars, Stanley Fish, university teacher

Language: English.

Published: Number 4(2025), pp. 77–95.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.77

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Number of downloads: 218,849

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The judge as a promoter of peace

Dr hab. Adam Zienkiewicz, prof. UWM

University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn

English abstract: The principal aim of this text is to draw attention to the singular role of a “promoter of peace”, which may be fulfilled nowadays both by a lawyer who provides legal assistance to a client and a judge. Discussing the matter from the standpoint of legal theory, the study will thus first examine the difference between judicial adjudication of disputes and their resolution, including methods based on the practice of peacemaking, which promotes peaceful interpersonal relations and positive personal transformation of the parties to disputes to establish between them a state known as positive peace. Subsequently, a dogmatic-legal analysis will seek to identify selected applicable regulations which offer the possibility of implementing, on the initiative or with the assistance of a judge, amicable modes of resolving legal disputes pending before a Polish civil court. In the final part of the study, the domestic normative perspective in the field of civil law will be supplemented with major model assumptions and objectives of a special type of court, a so-called Problem-Solving Court (developing especially in the USA), where the perpetrator of an offence who is subject to conventional court proceedings, is given an additional opportunity to effectively counter the causes of lawbreaking and conflicts with members of the community (e.g., ones stemming from drug or alcohol addiction abuse or mental disorders), based on the so-called problem-solving program tailored to the individual, which is coordinated by the judge and implemented by an interdisciplinary team of experts. These deliberations lead to the conclusion that the catalogue of legislative solutions in this respect is gradually expanding, creating a real opportunity to choose and apply various conciliatory methods of managing legal disputes, also on the initiative or with the active participation of the judge, who promotes the restoration of peaceful social relations.

Keywords: judge, peacemaker, Alternative Dispute Resolution, problem-solving court

Language: English

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 120-135.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.120

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Number of downloads: 244

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The Constitutive and Conventional Nature of Legal Interpretation Directives

Prof. dr hab. Marek Smolak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The article’s purpose is to demonstrate that the directives of legal interpretation are constitutive and conventional. The directives of legal interpretation are constitutive because they confer the status of legal interpretive practice on social practice. The directives of legal interpretation are conventional because they are arbitrary in the sense given to them by A. Marmor. The directives of legal interpretation constitute not only the legal interpretive practice, but also the values of this practice. Among these values, I include innovative thinking, reasoning by analogy, intellectual challenges. If constitutive conventions are responsive, i.e., if they respond to various human needs and values, then at the core of legal interpretive practice there are values that are momentous for those who participate in these practices. Two types of values are distinguished: values in a strong sense and in a weak sense. Values in the strong sense are values whose realization is acontextual, i.e., independent of any context of a given legal interpretive practice. I include certainty and uniformity of understanding of legal texts in this category of values. On the other hand, values in the weak sense are contextual values, i.e., ones that depend on the goals that legal interpretive practice is supposed to fulfil. Examples of contextual values are adaptability and stability of law. I considered that there is a special relationship between values in both the strong and weak senses and the directives of legal interpretation. Based on mutual expectations, members of a given community assume that a particular directive of legal interpretation best realizes an important value of legal interpretation. The correctness of the above relationship largely depends on previous legal interpretive practice.

Keywords: legal interpretation directives, constitutive rule, conventional rule, values in legal interpretive practice

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 80-96.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.80

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Number of downloads: 271

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Issue 3(40)/2024 of the „Archiwum…” is now available

Welcome to the issue 3(40)/2024 of the „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej”. The issue includes the following texts:

Articles:

Prof. UMK dr hab. Łukasz DOMINIAK

Libertarianism, Jusnaturalist Skepticism, and the Argument from the Legitimate Use of Force

Michał KORDZIŃSKI

The European Union as a Community of Well-Ordered Peoples? Object-Oriented Interpretation of John Rawls’ Law of Peoples. A Contribution to Future Research

Dr Wiktor KRZYMOWSKI

About the Pro-Constitutional Interpretative Directive In Dubio Pro Vita Humana

Prof. UŁ dr hab. Jerzy LESZCZYŃSKI

Political Agonism and Thinking About Law and Jurisprudence

Mgr Grzegorz LIPIŃSKI

The Understanding of Principles in Criminal Procedural Law

Mikołaj TRUSZKOWSKI

Formulating the Provisions on Entry into Force of a Generally Applicable Normative Act: Critical Analysis Engendered by the 2023 Act Amending the Electoral Code

Revews:

Mgr Agata DĄBROWSKA, Prof. UŁ dr hab. Jerzy LESZCZYŃSKI

Wojciech Zomerski, W kierunku demokratycznej nauki prawa? Dogmatyka, edukacja, postanalityczność. Warsaw 2023, pp. 383

Reports:

Dr Mateusz PĘKALA

I Górska Rajdokonferencja Filozofii Prawa Społeczny wymiar rządów prawa, Beskid Żywiecki, 12–14.04.2024

The issue is available HERE.