Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVRwww.ivr.org.pl

Search Results for: legal interpretation

Dialogical Concept of Legal Interpretation

Prof. dr hab. Zygmunt Tobor, mgr Konrad Kobyliński

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The purpose of this text is to present an outline of the dialogical concept of legal interpretation. It involves the need to establish the relationship between the legislature and courts. In the normative dimension, this concept includes an analysis of assumptions about the mutual roles of the legislature and courts in determining the substance of the law. In the descriptive dimension, the authors present tools that enable communication between the legislature and courts in order to improve the interpretation process. The authors describe the requirements for communication between courts and the legislature, and refer to existing solutions in Poland and the United States. In the text the importance of this issue is only signaled, but the authors believe that it is worth further research.

Keywords: legal interpretation, strategies of interpretation, communication theory of legal interpretation

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 35-48.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.35ENG

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Number of downloads: 540

Should a Court Be Understanding for the Legislator? On Legislative Error from the Perspective of the Theory of Legal Interpretation

Mgr Marek Suska

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: In the actual legislative processes, errors are often made: the legislator’s intentions are not always properly expressed in the legal provisions or there is insufficient clarity. The discrepancy between what the legislator said and what they meant to say poses a serious challenge to the theory and practice of legal interpretation. In this paper, the author analyses two possible reactions to a legislative error: correcting it or applying the provision in its literal meaning. The considerations are based on two decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court, because in criminal law the protection of the prima facie understanding of the text is a very important value. In the final part of the paper, the author indicates factors which can affect the court’s attitude towards a legislative error in a specific case.

Keywords: legislative error, scrivener’s error, legal interpretation, law-making

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(22)/2020, pp. 99-110.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.1.99

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Number of downloads: 774

The ‘clarification’ theory of legal interpretation as a theory of justification. Psycholinguistic perspective and the positivist idea of legal interpretation

Mgr Marcin Romanowicz

University of Warsaw


English abstract: Within the framework of legal positivism on the ground of Polish legal theory there was founded, in the scope of the issue of legal interpretation, the ‘clarification’ theory, formulated by J. Wróblewski. Adopting psycholinguistic perspective for the analysis of above mentioned theory allows to take the knowledge about human linguistic cognition into consideration and compare it with the vision of achieving understanding of legal text as understood by J. Wróblewski. Thus conducted “mental experiment” – moving from the level of the legal theory to the level of psycholinguistics – reveals “hidden” properties of J. Wróblewski theory of legal interpretation. First of all, as far as the question about the status of his theory is concerned, it allows to formulate a conclusion that it is neither a descriptive nor a normative theory of legal interpretation. It is possible to accept only as a normative theory of justification of interpretation decisions in the process of law application.

Keywords: Jerzy Wróblewski, ‘clarification’ theory of legal interpretation, psycholinguistics (keywords supplied by the editors)

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(2)/2011, pp. 55-74.

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Number of downloads: 716

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Terminological Consistency in the Legal System. A View at the Problem of Interpretation from the Perspective of Law-making Practice

Dr Marek SUSKA

Silesian University in Katowice

English abstract: The goal of the article is to determine whether the legal interpretation should be made with the assumption of consistency of terminology at the level of a branch of law or at the global level. The question is therefore whether the interpreter should presume that the legislator ‘by default’ refers those who apply the law only to the legal definitions contained in a certain, most general act within one branch of law, or whether, regardless of the branch, the legislator always uses a  uniform terminology. An analysis of the law-making practice may be a  source of useful cues to answer this question. First, the article reconstructs the requirements imposed on the drafters by the Principles of Legislative Technique. Secondly, several dozen acts passed by the Sejm of the 7th and 8th term of office are examined in terms of the presence of ‘definitional’ references to acts from the same branch of law and acts from another branch of law. In this way, it is established that only the presumption of a legal act maintain terminological consistency with legal definitions set out in the basic act for a given branch of law seems to be legitimate. The basic act should not be understood in an institutional way, but as one relating to a quasi-branch. The article also identifies at least some cases where it is justified or unjustified to use ‘explicit’ references to point out branch-level or global terminological consistency. The results of the analyses may find application in the discussion on the meaning of the directive of legal language in the theory and practice of interpretation, as well as in the theory and practice of legislation – in determining when it is necessary to use a provision referring to a legal definition.

Keywords: terminological consistency, provisions referring to other provisions, legal language, law-making, legal interpretation, system of law

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(34)/2023, pp.58-71

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280//AFPiFS.2023.1.58

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Number of downloads: 468

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

Law & Economics as a Theory of Decision Making in Legal Contexts – Decision Theoretical Foundations, Their Misinterpretations and Excessive Claims of Economic Analysis of Law

Mgr Magdalena Małecka

Polish Academy of Sciences

English abstract: The article treats law & economics as a proposal of a theory of decision making in legal settings. It is emphasized that the distinction between two approaches in economic analysis of law: the neoclassical and the behavioral one, is made with reference to two different theories of decision making applied in the realm of each approach. The neoclassical approach is based on the theory of expected utility, whereas the behavioral one – on prospect theory. According to the scholars on both sides, application of decision theory might be helpful in influencing behavior by legal norms in a more sophisticated way. The claim of the article is that law & economics scholars misinterpret the assumptions and propositions of the theories and/or formulate excessive claims, if they argue that decision theoretical findings provide knowledge about the way in which people’s decisions are influenced by law.

Keywords: law & economics, theory of decision making, legal norm

Language: English

Published: Number 1(4)/2012, pp. 34-50.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2012.1.34

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Number of downloads: 638

Classics of Modern Legal Philosophy and Theory

Scholars from Poland and around the world who shaped legal theory and philosophy – and, with each of them, texts published in the journal that concern their thought or closely related themes. All articles are free to read in open access.

World classics of modern legal philosophy and theory

Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)

English philosopher, jurist and social reformer, the founder of utilitarianism and a forerunner of modern legal positivism. Themes from this current are gathered in the Legal Positivism collection.

See also: Texts related to Jeremy Bentham’s concerns.

John Austin (1790–1859)

English jurist and legal theorist, the founder of analytical positivism and of the conception of law as the command of a sovereign backed by sanction. Stanley L. Paulson writes on this current in his study The Core of the Idea of Legal Positivism.

See also: Texts related to John Austin’s concerns.

Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949)

German legal philosopher and politician, author of the famous formula under which statutory lawlessness yields to supra-statutory justice. Bartosz Szyler devotes a study to the antinomies of his idea of law.

See also: Texts related to Gustav Radbruch’s concerns.

Hans Kelsen (1881–1973)

Austrian jurist and legal philosopher, the creator of the pure theory of law and of normativism. Around the pure theory and the basic norm the journal has published a translation of Stanley L. Paulson and a reconstruction of Kelsen’s discussion with Jerzy Wróblewski; see the Legal Positivism collection.

See also: Texts related to Hans Kelsen’s concerns.

Adolf Reinach (1883–1917)

German philosopher and jurist, a representative of the phenomenology of law, author of the conception of the a priori foundations of civil law and of the theory of social acts.

See also: Texts related to Adolf Reinach’s concerns.

Alf Ross (1899–1979)

Danish jurist and legal philosopher, a leading representative of Scandinavian realism and of the predictive account of legal validity. A kindred current of sociological jurisprudence is presented by Aleksander Olaf Szpojankowski in his text on Roscoe Pound.

See also: Texts related to Alf Ross’s concerns.

Lon L. Fuller (1902–1978)

American legal philosopher, a representative of the non-positivist current, author of the conception of the inner morality of law and a participant in the famous debate with H.L.A. Hart on the connection between law and morality. These themes are taken up in the Law and Morality collection.

See also: Texts related to Lon Fuller’s concerns.

Herbert L.A. Hart (1907–1992)

British legal philosopher, the leading representative of twentieth-century legal positivism, author of the conception of the rule of recognition and of the union of primary and secondary rules. The journal has published a translation of Hart’s lecture, a study by Andrzej Grabowski and an analysis of the rule of recognition.

See also: Texts related to H.L.A. Hart’s concerns.

John Rawls (1921–2002)

American political and social philosopher, author of the theory of justice as fairness. Wojciech Ciszewski analyses his conception in the journal.

See also: Texts related to John Rawls’s concerns.

Jürgen Habermas (1929–2026)

German philosopher and sociologist, a representative of social philosophy, the creator of the theory of communicative action and of the conception of deliberative democracy.

See also: Texts related to Jürgen Habermas’s concerns.

Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013)

American legal philosopher, the foremost critic of positivism, author of the conception of legal principles, integrity and law as an interpretive practice. Texts in this current are gathered in the Legal Positivism collection.

See also: Texts related to Ronald Dworkin’s concerns.

Joseph Raz (1939–2022)

British legal philosopher of Israeli origin, a representative of exclusive positivism, author of the service conception of legal authority and of the theory of practical reasons. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska analyses his moral philosophy in a two-part series.

See also: Texts related to Joseph Raz’s concerns.

John Finnis

Australian legal philosopher, the leading representative of contemporary natural law theory, author of the conception of basic human goods and practical reasonableness. Michał Sopiński analyses his thought in the journal.

See also: Texts related to John Finnis’s concerns.

Robert Alexy

German legal philosopher, author of the theory of principles as optimisation requirements, of the weighing formula and of a non-positivist account of law. Milena Korycka reconstructs his conception in the journal.

See also: Texts related to Robert Alexy’s concerns.

Polish classics of modern legal philosophy and theory

Leon Petrażycki (1867–1931)

Polish and Russian scholar, the creator of the psychological theory of law, of the conception of intuitive law, imperative-attributive emotions and the policy of law. Hanna Dębska devotes a study to his career.

See also: Texts related to Leon Petrażycki’s concerns.

Jerzy Lande (1886–1954)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, a pupil and the most important continuator of Leon Petrażycki, author of works in the theory and sociology of law.

See also: Texts related to Jerzy Lande’s concerns.

Czesław Znamierowski (1888–1967)

Polish philosopher and legal theorist, the creator of the theory of constructive norms and thetic acts, and a forerunner of the analysis of conventional acts in law.

See also: Texts related to Czesław Znamierowski’s concerns.

Czesław Martyniak (1906–1939)

Polish legal philosopher, a representative of Thomistic legal philosophy and of the natural-law critique of Kelsen’s normativism. Murdered by the German occupier in 1939.

See also: Texts related to Czesław Martyniak’s concerns.

Stanisław Ehrlich (1907–1997)

Polish theorist of law and politics, a scholar of pluralism, interest groups and group norms.

See also: Texts related to Stanisław Ehrlich’s concerns.

Grzegorz Leopold Seidler (1913–2004)

Polish scholar of the theory of state and law and of the history of political and legal doctrines.

See also: Texts related to Grzegorz Leopold Seidler’s concerns.

Kazimierz Opałek (1918–1995)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, a forerunner of analytical reflection on directives, norms and subjective rights.

See also: Texts related to Kazimierz Opałek’s concerns.

Zygmunt Ziembiński (1920–1996)

Polish legal theorist and philosopher, the creator of the Poznań school of legal theory, author of works on the logic of norms, the conception of coupled norms and the analysis of legal language.

See also: Texts related to Zygmunt Ziembiński’s concerns.

Józef Nowacki (1923–2005)

Polish legal theorist, a representative of analytical legal theory, a scholar of the rule of law, general clauses and the „appropriate” application of provisions.

See also: Texts related to Józef Nowacki’s concerns.

Jerzy Wróblewski (1926–1990)

Polish legal theorist, the creator of an original paradigm of legal interpretation and application (the clarificative theory of interpretation); among his continuators is Marek Zirk-Sadowski.

See also: Texts related to Jerzy Wróblewski’s concerns.

Wiesław Lang (1928–2016)

Polish legal theorist, a scholar of legal validity and of the relation between law and morality. These themes are gathered in the Law and Morality collection.

See also: Texts related to Wiesław Lang’s concerns.

Maciej Zieliński (1940–2020)

Polish legal theorist, the creator of the derivational conception of legal interpretation (omnia sunt interpretanda). Agnieszka Choduń presents it in the journal.

See also: Texts related to Maciej Zieliński’s concerns.

Judicial Update of the Meaning of a Legal Text in Three Questions

Dr Paulina Konca

University of Silesia, Katowice

English abstract: The aim is to illustrate the complexity of the process of judicial updating of the meaning of a  legal text in changing circumstances (e.g. developments in technology and science, social  changes) and to answer the question of the role of courts and the legislator in making updates.  On the basis of an analysis of literature, legislation and judicial practice, the basic problems of  updating a legal text and their selected solutions were presented. The topic has been widely  discussed in the context of the Constitution, while the literature on updating statutes is still  relatively rare. Meanwhile, the dynamics of diverse external changes is intense. It has become  urgent to develop a theoretical framework for this issue. Courts, when updating, must ask themselves three questions. First, has there been a change? Second, what is the impact of the  change on the meaning? Third, is the judiciary allowed to update? Within each of them, the  question arises as to who is entitled to make a binding conclusion: the courts or the legislature.  Ad 1. The determination of a change is often not difficult, but in doubtful cases where there is  no general agreement that circumstances have changed, the courts would be well advised not to  update on their own, but to rely on the legislature’s assessment of the extent in dispute. Ad 2. Courts determine the updated meaning, primarily guided by the purpose of the regulation.  However, even when updating the same provisions, two different courts may come to different  conclusions. Ad 3. Courts update, inter alia, when they conclude that the failure to update is an  omission on the part of the legislature and consider themselves entitled to correct this error.  Significantly, in some countries, the ability of the courts to update arises from legislation: the  Irish and Spanish provisions governing the issue is set out in the text. 

Key words: Interpretation, construction in changing circumstanceseparation of powers, courts, dynamic interpretation, lawmaker.

Language: Polish

Published: no. 1(42)/2025, pp. 40-59.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.40

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Number of downloads: 347

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Legal and Political Positivism – Uberto Scarpelli’s Concept

Dr Karol Gregorczuk

The University of Gdańsk

English abstract: Unlike most representatives of legal positivism, one of Scarpelli’s main assumptions was to transfer reflection on positivism from the sphere of science to the sphere of politics. The legal system is a human activity, and as such it must be considered through norms, assessments and values. Normative statements are formulated from an internal point of view (according to Hart), which requires prior involvement of a given person and the adoption of a specific critical and reflective attitude towards legal rules. Legal activity consisting in the reconstruction, systematization and interpretation of norms essentially serves to express the political will of society organized into a modern state. This political will expressed through positive law is understood as shaped by values, choices, programs and orders of behavior which, expressed in a certain way, can, under certain conditions, be attributed to the entire society, can be considered as the general will of a politically organized society. Law is the result of purposeful activity of entities equipped with legislative competences, which thus pursue specific political goals.

Keywords: Scarpelli, positivism, political, legal, norms

Language: Polish

Published: nr 4(41)/2024, pp. 104-112.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.104

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Number of downloads: 256

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

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