Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVRwww.ivr.org.pl

Search Results for: legal interpretation

Legal Interpretation

A thematic collection of the “Archive of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy”. Texts on legal interpretation – its theories, directives and limits, and its role in adjudication. All articles are available free of charge in open access.

Theories of legal interpretation

Polish legal theory contributed two classic conceptions to the analysis of interpretation: Jerzy Wróblewski’s clarificative theory, on which interpretation is called for when doubt arises as to the meaning of a provision, and Maciej Zieliński’s derivational conception, on which every legal text requires full interpretive reconstruction of norms of conduct (omnia sunt interpretanda). The dispute between the two approaches – including the status of the maxim clara non sunt interpretanda – remains among the liveliest strands of Polish jurisprudence, alongside research on interpretive directives, the linguistic limits of interpretation, legislative materials and new empirical tools.

Selected texts

See also

Classics of Modern Legal Philosophy and Theory · Legal Positivism. Profiles: Jerzy Wróblewski · Maciej Zieliński.

For authors

The “Archive” publishes articles in legal theory and philosophy – including work on interpretation and legal argumentation – in Polish and English, in open access with no publication charges and with double-blind peer review. The journal is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and ERIH PLUS (100 points on the Polish ministerial list). See the guidelines for authors.

An editorial collection. Last updated: July 2026.

3rd Mountain Conference-Hike on the Philosophy of Law – Polish Section of the IVR, entitled “Sawa Frydman’s Concept of Legal Interpretation”, Międzygórze, 15–18 May 2025.

Dr Paulina Łabieniec

University of Łódź

Mgr Paweł Boike

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

Report language: Polish

Published in: Issue 4(45)/2025, pp. 125–127

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.4.125

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Number of downloads: 219,283

The text is available under the Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

The influence of Marxism on the interpretation of law in Poland (some remarks concerning the theory of legal interpretation by Jerzy Wróblewski)

Dr hab. Joanna Helios, prof. UWr

Dr hab. Wioletta Jedlecka, prof. UWr

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The aim of this article is an attempt to conceptualize Jerzy Wroblewski’s theory of legal interpretation in the context of examining the influence of Marxism on interpretative practices. One of the legal theorists who undertook the task of demonstrating that Jerzy Wroblewski’s theory of interpretation is characterized by a philosophical stance rooted in the adoption of Marxist premises as the foundational philosophical assumptions underlying theoretical activities in legal science is Zbigniew Pulka. This article discusses three topics: (1) the Marxist philosophical stance – Marxist axiology, (2) people’s legal interpretation, (3) the clarificatory concept of interpretation.

Keywords: interpretation, Marxism, communism, J. Wróblewski, clarificatory concept of interpretation

Language: English

Published: Number 3(44)/2025, pp. 7-19.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.3.7

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Number of downloads: 256

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The Constitutive and Conventional Nature of Legal Interpretation Directives

Prof. dr hab. Marek Smolak

Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

English abstract: The article’s purpose is to demonstrate that the directives of legal interpretation are constitutive and conventional. The directives of legal interpretation are constitutive because they confer the status of legal interpretive practice on social practice. The directives of legal interpretation are conventional because they are arbitrary in the sense given to them by A. Marmor. The directives of legal interpretation constitute not only the legal interpretive practice, but also the values of this practice. Among these values, I include innovative thinking, reasoning by analogy, intellectual challenges. If constitutive conventions are responsive, i.e., if they respond to various human needs and values, then at the core of legal interpretive practice there are values that are momentous for those who participate in these practices. Two types of values are distinguished: values in a strong sense and in a weak sense. Values in the strong sense are values whose realization is acontextual, i.e., independent of any context of a given legal interpretive practice. I include certainty and uniformity of understanding of legal texts in this category of values. On the other hand, values in the weak sense are contextual values, i.e., ones that depend on the goals that legal interpretive practice is supposed to fulfil. Examples of contextual values are adaptability and stability of law. I considered that there is a special relationship between values in both the strong and weak senses and the directives of legal interpretation. Based on mutual expectations, members of a given community assume that a particular directive of legal interpretation best realizes an important value of legal interpretation. The correctness of the above relationship largely depends on previous legal interpretive practice.

Keywords: legal interpretation directives, constitutive rule, conventional rule, values in legal interpretive practice

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 80-96.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.80

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Number of downloads: 272

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Hermeneutical Elements in the Derivational Model of Legal Interpretation

Dr Jędrzej Janicki

University of Łódź

English abstract: The aim of this article is to demonstrate the possibility of presenting the derivational theory of legal interpretation as a theory of a hermeneutical nature. In order to achieve this goal, I distinguish five elements that can be found both in the derivational model of legal interpretation and in the hermeneutical way of thinking. These elements are: (1) a specific way of treating dis-cretion in interpreting cultural products; (2) the linguistic nature of understanding; (3) the histo-ricity of understanding; (4) the circularity of understanding, and (5) the problem of pre-understanding. In the article, I try to show that the five hermeneutic elements can be found with-in the derivational model of legal interpretation. The aim of the article is not to unambiguously determine whether the derivational model of legal interpretation is a hermeneutical one (this would require the construction of a precise definition of hermeneutics, which I do not undertake in this article), but only to mark certain elements of this theory of interpretation which can also be found in hermeneutic thinking.

Keywords: derivational model of legal interpretation, hermeneutics, circularity of understanding, historicity of understanding, problem of pre-understanding

Language: Polish

Published: Number 1(38)/2024, pp. 48-59.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.1.48

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Number of downloads: 355

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Argument from Precedent in Legal Interpretation of Texts of Legal Acts from the Perspective of a Derivative Concept of Legal Interpretation

Prof. US dr hab. Agnieszka Choduń

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The aim of this article is to ascertain whether in the Polish legal culture in which precedent is not a legislative fact, it can become an argument in the process of judicial interpretation. The article posits that an analysis of precedent as an argument in judicial interpretation must be carried out in relation to a particular concept (or theory) of legal interpretation. Hence, it adopts the Maciej Zieliński’s (derivative) concept of legal interpretation as a point of reference for understanding “legal interpretation”. The choice is based on the following reasons: 1) this concept offers a complex approach to legal interpretation (which assumes that interpretation can be concluded if three directives have been applied by an interpreter: linguistic, systemic and functional); 2) this concept considers the realistic elements of legal interpretation in the form of directives linked to the interpretative findings achieved in judicial practice; 3) this concept stipulates that legal interpretation has certain roles, which allow establishing whether the outcome of legal reasoning is within the scope of the interpretation or whether it constitutes a “normative novelty”. As a result of this analysis, it can be concluded that depending on the content of the directives of interpretation adopted in a given legal culture, the proceedings of the entity applying a law will have either an interpretative or a legislative character and will consequently determine how invoking earlier court judgments in legal interpretation will be classified.

Keywords: precedent, legal interpretation, roles of interpretation

Language: English

Published: Number 3(32)/2022, pp. 19-33

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2022.3.19

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Number of downloads: 543

This text is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non Commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.

The Role of Values in Legal Interpretation: The Normative Approach

Prof. US dr hab. Olgierd Bogucki

University of Szczecin

English abstract: The article presents and analyses a certain theory of values and their role in legal interpretation. The article calls it a ‘componential’ theory of values. According to the theory, values in law create structures based on global assessments: comprehensive axiological judgements that consider all the relevant values and degrees of their realization. The basic theorem of the theory is the theorem on isomorphy between the global assessment and the content of the legal norm. This ‘componential’ theory is the basis of the normative model of legal interpretation. According to this model, the interpreter should reconstruct the global assessment and choose the one possible result of interpretation – the one norm of conduct – which will be the most consistent with this judgement. In order to reconstruct the aforementioned global assessment, the interpreter should consider the legal text, case law and legal literature, legislative materials and interpretative presumption.

The article reconstructs the philosophical presumptions behind the aforementioned theory and model. The article points out that the fundamental value behind the normative model is the intersubjectivity of legal interpretation as an element of the rule of law. The article also indicates that the theory and model described above are based on legal positivism, but with significant connections with legal hermeneutics, Dworkin’s theory of law, and argumentative approaches to law. In addition, the theory seems to presume weak commensurability of values.

Keywords: legal interpretation, theory of law, philosophy of law, axiology, ‘componential’ theory of values

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 96-108.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.96

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Number of downloads: 918

On Legal Interpretation and Its Practical Dimension: The Context of Judicial Application of the Law

Prof. dr hab. Leszek Leszczyński

Maria Curie-Skłodowska University

English abstract: The aim of the study is to identify those aspects of legal interpretation which may strengthen its practical dimension. The operative interpretation, distinguished in the theory of law, needs to be developed, inter alia, in order to strengthen the legal discourse as a whole and to contribute to better communication and deeper integration between dogmatic and theoretical legal studies. As a result, the theory of interpretation itself would become more complete. Three most important aspects of giving a practical dimension to various interpretive approaches are analysed in the paper. The first of them is the use of the so-called decision-making character of the operative interpretation, when such interpretation is made in connection with the findings of fact, which limits its scope, while at the same time broadening the number of the established normative bases for decisions, and also in the context of the subsequently-formulated justification of the interpretative decision. The second one is its validation-derivative approach, indicating the phases of operative interpretation, the multiplicity of carriers of law taken into account and the distinction of roles played at particular phases by the each type of rules of interpretation. Finally, the third aspect points to the need to include operative interpretation in the comparative approach, the main determinant of which are the differences of interpretation in particular branches of law.

Keywords: operative legal interpretation, decision-making character of interpretation, validation-derivative approach, comparative approach

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 66-80.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.66

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Number of downloads: 823

On an Interpreter’s Game with the Legal Text and Extratextual Factors in the Derivative Concept of Legal Interpretation

Dr Paweł Jabłoński, prof. UWr dr hab. Przemysław Kaczmarek

University of Wrocław

English abstract: The aim of this paper is to show the derivative concept of legal interpretation from the point of view of the structure of limits of the juridical power. This structure includes the politico-legal culture, the legal text, the juridical culture, and personal factors, such as ethical and aesthetic judgements.

These days, the derivative concept is the most influential Polish theory of legal interpretation. According to this concept the process of interpreting the law is a kind of a game between the legal text and extratextual factors, which are treated as extratextual limits of juridical power. On the one hand, the legal text does not determine the full meaning of the law, although it has great importance for it. On the other hand, the derivative concept precisely identifies certain others factors that are relevant for the content of law.

Keywords: derivative concept of legal interpretation, limits of juristic power, legal text

Language: Original printed in Polish, English translation available below

Published: Number 2(23)/2020, pp. 49-65.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2020.2.49ENG

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Number of downloads: 503

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