Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

IVRwww.ivr.org.pl

Search Results for: legal interpretation

Principles of Law

A thematic collection of the “Archive of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy”. Texts on the principles of law – the ways this notion is understood and the role principles play in the legal system and in legal argument. All articles are available free of charge in open access.

Disputes over the notion of a legal principle

The contemporary debate on legal principles was opened by Ronald Dworkin, who contrasted principles with rules in his polemic against positivism, and was developed by Robert Alexy, who understood principles as optimisation requirements to be weighed in cases of collision. Polish legal theory, however, has followed its own path. In the classic study by Sławomira Wronkowska, Maciej Zieliński and Zygmunt Ziembiński (Zasady prawa. Zagadnienia podstawowe, 1974), principles are not a separate kind of norm opposed to rules, but norms of particular importance or of a high degree of generality; a distinction is drawn between the directival sense, in which a principle is a norm, and the descriptive sense, in which it is a statement about the characteristic features of a given body of regulation. The very notion of a legal principle thus remains contested, and different branches of legal scholarship understand it differently.

Selected texts

See also

Classics of Modern Legal Philosophy and Theory · Law and Morality. Profiles: Robert Alexy · Józef Nowacki · Zygmunt Ziembiński.

For authors

The “Archive” publishes articles in legal theory and philosophy – including work on legal principles and constitutional argument – in Polish and English, in open access with no publication charges and with double-blind peer review. The journal is indexed in Scopus, DOAJ and ERIH PLUS (100 points on the Polish ministerial list). See the guidelines for authors.

An editorial collection. Last updated: July 2026.

Stanisław Brzozowski’s Philosophy of Labour and the Search for a New Sovereign

Mgr Damian Kazimierski

University of Warsaw

English abstract: The Polish constitutional model is founded on the principle of sovereign power vested in the Nation, as expressed in Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. However, such an unequivocal designation of the sovereign proves problematic in practice and has been subject to criticism by a significant portion of legal scholarship. The aim of this article is to propose a revision of the Polish concept of sovereignty of the Nation, said revision based on the philosophy of labour developed by Stanisław Brzozowski. Through an analysis of Brzozowski’s philosophical writings, the article puts forward ways of incorporating the core value of his thought – human labour – into the system of government. A test for legal regulations is proposed, enabling an assessment of these legal regulations in terms of their relationship to the sovereign as understood through the lens of the philosophy of labour, that is, their relationship to the producer or the worker. The sovereign is one whose life does not depend on natural conditions, who is capable of imposing their will upon the world – i.e. the producer. In Brzozowski’s writings, this category is defined in an exceptionally broad manner, setting it apart from the notion of the worker in Marxist theory. This broader definition allows for the inclusion of the self-employed, public-sector employees, and individuals employed in roles not directly linked to production, thus significantly expanding the group of those who may be considered as wielding sovereign power, according to the framework developed based on Brzozowski’s essays. The article offers an original interpretation of Brzozowski’s philosophy of labour, proposing its application in political science and legal theory – fields which have previously been rarely discussed in the context of this philosophy.

Key words: Stanislaw Brzozowski (1878–1911), philosophy of labour, principle of national sovereignty, sovereign

Language: polish

Published: Number 2(47)/2026, pp. 41–58.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.2.41

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Issue No. 1(46)/2026 of the “Archive of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy” (Polish Journal IVR) has been published

The new issue No. 1(46)/2026 of the “Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej” has been published.

The current issue addresses the presidential power of pardon from the perspective of theories of interpretation and constitutional argumentation, as well as questions of judicial independence, constitutive rules, and methodology in legal research.

We invite you to read the issue.

The Use of the Power of Pardon by the President of the Republic of Poland in Light of Arguments Outside the Text of the Constitution – Legislative Materials and Established Practice (Case Study)

Sławomir Piekarczyk

University of Silesia in Katowice

Zygmunt Tobor

University of Silesia in Katowice

English abstract: The case whereby the President of the Republic of Poland applied the right of pardon towards individuals who had not been validly convicted has revived ongoing discussions regarding whether such an action is consistent with the Constitution. The problematic aspect in this regard is not only the admissibility of so-called individual abolition but also the very manner of granting pardon while bypassing the procedure provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the contentious nature of the issue arises from ambiguities in the Constitution’s text, this study’s research objective is to present useful tools outside of this text that may assist in its interpretation. To achieve this, an analysis of legislative materials from sessions of the National Assembly’s Constitutional Commission is conducted, and the established practice (constitutional custom) concerning the problematic issues is discussed. The research conclusions warrant the thesis that these extratextual arguments provide strong justifications for specific interpretative hypotheses. Regarding the first issue, the hypothesis is that the right of pardon does not encompass individual abolition. The hypothesis concerning the second issue is the inadmissibility of a procedure that bypasses the Code of Criminal Procedure regulations.

Key words: power of pardon, legislative materials, established practice, legal text interpretation

Language: polish

Published: Number 1(2026), pp. 5–21.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2026.1.5

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Gustav Klimt’s Jurisprudence and the Problem of the Scale of Claims on the Law

Natalia Regina Skoczylas

University of Wrocław

Dr Mateusz Wojtanowski

University of Wrocław

Abstrakt w języku polskim: The subject of this article is Gustav Klimt’s Jurisprudenz, a work intended as part of a larger exhibition of paintings depicting specific fields of knowledge. In contrast to the prevailing interpretation of the work in question as an expression of the artist’s personal sense of having been wronged, the authors of this article propose an alternative perspective, suggesting that the image carries a valuable message for legal discourse. As they argue, the image in question makes it possible to identify a potential way of improving the practice of law by reducing claims on it. In terms of the axiological perspective of the considerations, the article is located within the liberal democratic tradition. The article has an interdisciplinary character as Jurisprudence is interpreted from the perspective of art history and legal philosophy.

Słowa kluczowe: Gustav Klimt, Jurisprudenz, art history, philosophy of law, claims to law, aesthetics of law

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(43)/2025, s. 58-79.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.58

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Liczba ściągnięć: 238

Tekst jest dostępny na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

Around Selected Themes in the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Part II

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University in Kraków

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: Joseph Raz, perfectionist liberalism, personal autonomy, group rights as a category, political conception of human rights, Ronald Dworkin, ethical monism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 42-57.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.42

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Number of downloads: 234

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William David Ross’s prima facie duties vis-à-vis Ronald Dworkin’s principles of law

Dr hab. Milena Korycka-Zirk, prof. UMK

Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

English abstract: Prima facie duties central to W.D. Ross’s concept of ethical conflict and principles of law, which are, in turn, central to R. Dworkin’s individualistic conception of law as interpretation, show similarities in the process of their application. A comparative analysis of prima facie duties and principles of law leads to the conclusion that there is a shared essence underlying the notion of normative conflict (collision of prima facie duties or legal principles in so-called “hard cases”). This essence consists in the assumed importance of the factual situation as a factor determining an ethical and legal choice from among conflicting duties or principles, and the importance of the decision-making subject in resolving the conflict. Factuality and the unique subject (whether the “plain man” or “Judge Hercules”) are the factors that condition the possibility of identifying the proper duty and nonabstract right. Simultaneously, these are the factors that establish normative conflicts as disputes not determinable by an abstractly assumed moral principle; they open normativity to new narratives, to development, and to evolution. They individualize the conflict through the individualized nature of facts and the decision-making subject. Thus, a comparative analysis may lead to the conclusion that the assumption of openness to collisions of principles and duties is an expression of liberal thought, as it is not a narrative that imposes or excludes. Any abstract approach to conflict resolution is inherently oppressive, as it disregards the importance of the decision-making subject and the complexity of factual situations. Individualism opens up the conflict rather than closing it. This is the nature of declarations of individual rights and freedoms – when conceptualized as legal principles, they inevitably expose rights and freedoms to conflict.

Keywords: prima facie duties, principles of law, hard case, collision of principles, pluralism, individualism

Language: Polish

Published: Number 2(43)/2025, pp. 22-41.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2025.2.22

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Number of downloads: 246

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Around Selected Themes in the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz: Part I

Prof. dr hab. Beata Polanowska-Sygulska

Jagiellonian University, Kraków

English abstract: One of the most eminent contemporary legal philosophers, Joseph Raz, made significant contributions not only to the aforementioned discipline, but also to political philosophy and moral philosophy, the three branches of which, in his view, contribute to practical philosophy. J. Raz’s achievements in the latter two areas are less familiar to the Polish reader than his concepts in the field of jurisprudence, all the more so because none of his works, which are part of the aforementioned, more general fields, has been translated into Polish. The present essay is devoted to the key threads of the thinker’s inquiries in the field of moral philosophy. The reconstruction made of J. Raz’s views takes into account the following ideas: his original version of ethical pluralism, the concept of constitutive incommensurability, a specific understanding of the universality of values, the thesis of their social dependence and the concepts of personal sense and personal attachment. The interpretation of the Oxford philosopher’s reflections is enriched by two digressions, referring in turn – to Charles Taylor’s critique of the instrumental way of life and to Ronald Dworkin’s underlying jurisprudence of ethical monism. This is because arguments can be derived from the reflections of the protagonist of the essay, which call into question the theses of the two aforementioned thinkers.

The presentation and analysis of the key themes of J. Raz’s moral philosophy is complemented by the author’s reminiscences of her meetings and conversations with the Oxford scholar.

Key words: Joseph Raz, ethical pluralism, constitutive incommensurability, social dependence thesis, personal meaning, personal attachment, universality of values.

Language: Polish

Published: no. 1(42)/2025, pp. 60-76.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.36280/AFPiFS.2024.4.60

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Number of downloads: 360

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Issue 4(41)/2024 of the „Archiwum…” is now available

Welcome to the issue 4(41)/2024 of the „Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej”. It is a thematic issue entitled: „Autonomy of Law: Classical Interpretations and New Challenges”, edited by Prof. UWr Dr. Maciej Pichlak and Dr. Mateusz Wojtanowski. The issue includes the following texts:

Articles:

Prof. UWr dr hab. Maciej PICHLAK, Dr Mateusz WOJTANOWSKI

In Search of the Nomos of Law. Classical Interpretations and New Challenges to the Autonomy of Law

Dr Paweł JABŁOŃSKI

On the Difference Between a Strong and Weak Version of the Idea of an Internal Point of View

Prof. UAM dr hab. Karolina M. CERN, Prof. UAM dr hab. Barbara JANUSZ-POHL

„Back and forth” – The Rule of Law from its Origins to its Application in the Adjudication of the CJEU

Prof. dr hab. Przemysław KACZMAREK

Goodbye, Rule of Law? Diagnosis and Perspective

Prof. UG dr hab. Maciej WOJCIECHOWSKI

The Structural Determinants of Attitudes of Distrust in the Practice of Professional Roles by Representatives of Selected Legal Public Trust Professions

Prof. UZ dr hab. Martyna ŁASZEWSKA-HELLRIEGEL

Autonomy of Law in the Face of Bioethical Problems

Dr hab. Rafał MAŃKO

The Question of the Autonomy of Law in the Light of E.B. Pašukanis’s Hylomorphic Theory

Dr Karol GREGORCZUK

Legal and Political Positivism – Uberto Scarpelli’s Concept

From the life of the Polish Section of IVR:

The Results of the Competition of the Association of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy – Polish Section of IVR for the Best Doctoral Thesis in the Field of Theory and Philosophy of Law

The issue is available HERE.

Number 4(41)/2024 [PL]

Articles:

Prof. UWr dr hab. Maciej PICHLAK, Dr Mateusz WOJTANOWSKI

In Search of the Nomos of Law. Classical Interpretations and New Challenges to the Autonomy of Law

Dr Paweł JABŁOŃSKI

On the Difference Between a Strong and Weak Version of the Idea of an Internal Point of View

Prof. UAM dr hab. Karolina M. CERN, Prof. UAM dr hab. Barbara JANUSZ-POHL

„Back and forth” – The Rule of Law from its Origins to its Application in the Adjudication of the CJEU

Prof. dr hab. Przemysław KACZMAREK

Goodbye, Rule of Law? Diagnosis and Perspective

Prof. UG dr hab. Maciej WOJCIECHOWSKI

The Structural Determinants of Attitudes of Distrust in the Practice of Professional Roles by Representatives of Selected Legal Public Trust Professions

Prof. UZ dr hab. Martyna ŁASZEWSKA-HELLRIEGEL

Autonomy of Law in the Face of Bioethical Problems

Dr hab. Rafał MAŃKO

The Question of the Autonomy of Law in the Light of E.B. Pašukanis’s Hylomorphic Theory

Dr Karol GREGORCZUK

Legal and Political Positivism – Uberto Scarpelli’s Concept

 

From the life of the Polish Section of IVR:

The Results of the Competition of the Association of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy – Polish Section of IVR for the Best Doctoral Thesis in the Field of Theory and Philosophy of Law

 

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