Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Dlaczego kooperatyzm Edwarda Abramowskiego może nie być utopią

Dr Karol Kuźmicz

Uniwersytet w Białymstoku

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Edward Abramowski (1868–1918) was a famous Polish theorist of cooperativism. He wasa socialist but critical assumptions of Marxism theory, which dominated at the turn of 19thand 20th century. The author thesis is that Abramowski’s ideas were not utopian. His ideaare confirm in reality since nowadays cooperatives and cooperative movement are part ofsocio-economic reality. According to Abramowski cooperative possess following features:1) is a cell of the future society; 2) is a voluntary association for the common interestsof people with equal rights; 3) is a co-own and jointly govern; 4) law without coercion isthe service of all man and who voluntarily accept it; 5) protects individual freedom; 6) theprinciple of majority does not infringe the freedom of individuals; 7) cooperative is part ofthe creation of a new world. Abramowski did not accepted idea of revolutionary struggle.He believed in the essence of cooperativism is the idea of human brotherhood. This is notonly the social message, but first of all the moral message for change the human relations.

Słowa kluczowe: Edward Abramowski, kooperatyzm, utopia

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(8)/2014, s. 29-40

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Liczba ściągnięć: 338

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:Edward Abramowski, kooperatyzm, utopia

W okowach prawniczego sensus communis. O trudnościach uprawiania krytycznie zorientowanej socjologii prawa

Dr Hanna Dębska

Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny w Krakowie

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The Polish sociology of law is unfamiliar with the critical sociology of law as proposedby P. Bourdieu – one of the most acclaimed contemporary sociologists. Therefore the mainaim of the paper is to indicate the causes of this neglection. The text also points out waysin which Bourdieu’s approach can assist in describing and explaining the social functioningof the legal universe. There are several reasons for the lack of reception of Bourdieu’stheory. The lack of critical debates in the field of law is caused by the assumptions of thetheory. Its main goal is to uncover the mechanisms of domination. Bourdieu’s project givesan opportunity not only to disclose the mechanisms by which the law preserves existingsocial relations, but also to discredit its universality by showing that it favours dominantgroups and agents. As such, Bourdieu’s theory threatens the foundations of the field oflaw. Another reason for this negligence among the Polish sociologists of law is structuralin nature. Firstly, the problem lies in the location of the field of law in the field of power.Secondly, in a specific position that sociology of law holds at faculties of law: academicswho are working on that field are mostly lawyers entangled in legal thinking schemata (legaldoxa), legal sensus communis which is considered as indisputable in the field of law.

Słowa kluczowe: socjologia prawa, Pierre Bourdieu, legal doxa

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(8)/2014, s. 18-28

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Liczba ściągnięć: 368

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:legal doxa, Pierre Bourdieu, socjologia prawa

Krótka historia brytyjskiej Krytycznej Konferencji Prawniczej albo o odpowiedzialności krytyka

Prof. dr Costas Douzinas

Birkbeck, Uniwersytet Londyński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: General jurisprudence is a type of thinking about law and the social bond developed by British critical legal scholars. Returning to the classical concerns of (legal) philosophy, it examines the legal aspects of social reproduction both inside and outside state law, treating posited law as a part of wider legality. It brings back to the centre the aesthetic, ethical and material aspects of legality, as well as includes the political economy of law, the legal constructions of subjectivity and the ways in which gender, race or sexuality create forms of identity both disciplining bodies and offering sites of resistance. The British Critical Legal Conference (CLC) is a school of thought committed to a plurality of theoretical approaches to law and to radical politics. The first CLC took place in 1985 and has taken place annually without interruption since. The CLC has introduced a number of themes, approaches and strategies unknown or dismissed by mainstream scholarship, including semiotics, rhetoric, literature, aesthetics and psychoanalysis. A variety of critical schools, such as postmodernism, phenomenology, postcolonialism, critical race, feminism, queer theory, art theory and history, the ethics of otherness, the ontology of plural singularity, the critique of biopolitics and post–politics have been pioneered in the CLC.

Słowa kluczowe: krytyczne studia nad prawem, estetyka, etyka, Brytyjska Krytyczna Konferencja Prawnicza

Język artykułu: polski
Tłumaczenie: Rafał Mańko

Opublikowano: Numer 1(8)/2014, s. 5-17

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Liczba ściągnięć: 387

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:Brytyjska Krytyczna Konferencja Prawnicza, estetyka, etyka, krytyczne studia nad prawem

System uzasadnienia teorii sprawiedliwości Johna Rawlsa

Mgr Wojciech Ciszewski

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The paper considers a fundamental issue set against the backcloth of John Rawls’s theory of justice, namely the structure of its justification system. The issue is so significant, because justification fulfills a key role in the Rawlsian conception. J. Rawls offers a sophisticated system consisting of different arguments aimed at reaching full justification. In the author’s opinion, there are five elements that relate to each other: 1) original position with the idea of the veil of ignorance, 2) reflective equilibrium, 3) public reason, 4) overlapping consensus, and 5) fundamental constructivist ideas. The five above mentioned arguments seem to be based on four different argumentative strategies: 1) a coherentist strategy – referring to the general and internal coherence of the system; 2) a contractualist strategy – based on the notion of social contract; 3) a pragmatic strategy – referring to the connection with effective social practices; and 4) a constructivist strategy which is founded in the particular view of reasonableness. The justification system evolves from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. However, though the system develops, it is always aimed at the same goal – to gather our considered beliefs and facts about a modern society into a coherent set of judgments which may claim to be valid.

Słowa kluczowe: John Rawls, sprawiedliwość jako bezstronność, zasłona niewiedzy, sytuacja pierwotna

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 34-53.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
421

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:John Rawls, sprawiedliwość jako równość szans, sytuacja pierwotna, zasłona niewiedzy

Pojęcie dowodu jako otwarta rana prawa: niezmiennie błędna aporia?

Prof. dr José Manuel Aroso Linhares

Uniwersytet w Coimbrze

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: In the paper I would like to allude to the possibilities that at last seem recognisable (and can be explored) when, expressly refuting the scission postulate (either in its luminous positive version or in its deconstructive aporetic reproduction), an internally relevant thesis for methodological unity between evidentiary adjudication and adjudication tout court (between judicial reasoning with proof and adjudicative reasoning as the realisation of Law) is advocated – with the certainty that the defence of this claim does not deny (or dilute) the specificity of the evidence problem, but instead provides this specificity with new opportunities for being understood and experienced in direct connection with the (increasing!) need to identify law’s specific project and its autonomous practical world as an unmistakable cultural acquisition. To condense the argument, I would say that methodological unity has to do with the priority of controversy – as a specific practical structure demanding judgment and the constitutive entrance of the comparing Third – whereas the specificity of evidential judgment corresponds to the irradiance of the referential claim and the narrative intelligibility that identifies it.

Słowa kluczowe: prawo dowodowe, Piyel Haldar, sądowe rozumowanie dowodowe, orzeczenie jako realizacja prawa

Język artykułu: polski
Tłumaczenie: Bartosz Wojciechowski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 5-20.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
395

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:orzeczenie jako realizacja prawa, Piyel Haldar, prawo dowodowe, sądowe rozumowanie dowodowe

O trzech granicach władzy prawniczej

Dr Paweł Jabłoński, Dr Przemysław Kaczmarek

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: According to the initially assumed concept of limitations of lawyers’ power the most important elements of those limitations are: legal text, legal culture, and ethics. This structure is characterized by the relations where the anterior element defines the framework of the latter, i. e. text affects legal culture and ethics, while legal culture affects ethics. However, exceptions apply where the latter element might lead to the collapse of the framework of the primary factor (for instance, interpretation contra legem based on axiological argumentation). The aforementioned structure of limitations of legal power is complemented by interaction of various other elements, such as social expectations, political entanglement (depending on the extent to which it is not consumed by ethics) and non-judicial expertise.

Słowa kluczowe: granice władzy prawniczej, tekst prawny, kultura prawna, etyka

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 93-108.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
395

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:etyka, granice władzy prawniczej, kultura prawna, tekst prawny

O sposobach pojmowania twórczego charakteru interpretacji

Dr Olgierd Bogucki

Uniwersytet Szczeciński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the notion of creative interpretation (of any text, especially creative interpretation of a legal text). The author points out that there are two different meanings of the expression “creative interpretation”. The first one can be called “ontological” and the second one – “methodological”. A given interpretation is ontologically creative when it creates a new object (which is a new meaning of some sort) and it is methodologically creative when it is established without applying any rules. Different theoretic approaches to legal interpretation presuppose different relations between ontological creativeness and methodological creativeness. The article explores some of them. The main thesis of the article is that when we say that a given interpretation is ontologically creative, we do not need to say it is methodologically creative (and vice versa).

Słowa kluczowe: interpretacja prawa, wykładnia prawa, interpretacja twórcza ontologicznie, interpretacja twórcza metodologicznie

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 21-33.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
402

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:interpretacja prawa, interpretacja twórcza metodologicznie, interpretacja twórcza ontologicznie, wykładnia prawa

O lukach w prawie rzadko spotykanych słów kilka

Dr Maciej Koszowski

Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu w Dąbrowie Górniczej

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The article addresses the issue of legal gaps (lacunas). Specifically, the author puts forward the general definition of legal gap which uses the concept of ‘automatically applicable’ legal rule as well as presupposes specific understanding of law – namely, that it is consisted solely of the rules of the mentioned type. Next, basing upon that definition, he defines three kinds of lacunas that are commonly distinguished in Polish and international scholarly literature, i.e. extra, intra and contra legem. As it is demonstrated, the merits of proffered definitions are manifold. First of all, they reduce the dependence of the notion of legal gap on value judgment. Secondly, they fairly well fit into the structure of contemporary legal orders. Thirdly, owing to them, the filling of legal gaps is not pointless. And lastly, the other kinds of lacunas one may encounter in academic literature are not at odds with the proffered theory, at least not by definition. At the end of the article, in the light of the main idea of the author’s conception, the Anglo -Saxon notion of the case of first impression is discussed, taking into account different models of (approaches to) the phenomenon of a binding judicial precedent.

Słowa kluczowe: luka w prawie, luka extra legem, luka intra legem, luka contra legem

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 109-122.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
1 401

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:luka contra legem, luka extra legem, luka intra legem, luka w prawie

Czy pojęcie prawa jest pojęciem z istoty spornym?

Dr Adam Dyrda

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Some legal thinkers (R. Dworkin amongst them) suppose that the concept of law is an essentially contested concept. This article firstly introduces the idea of essentially contested concepts, developed by W.B. Gallie. Secondly, it is argued that the concept of law cannot be perceived as an essentially contested concept, though some related concepts (such as “the rule of law”, according to J. Waldron’s analysis) can. Finally, I propose some arguments, in which I partly follow K. Ehrenberg’s recent analysis, showing that in Dworkinean terms, calling law an essentially contested concept may raise doubts and controversy.

Słowa kluczowe: spór, pojęcie, koncepcja, pojęcia z istoty sporne

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 54-67.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
377

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:koncepcja, pojęcia z istoty sporne, pojęcie, spór

Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część II

Dr Waldemar Gontarski

Europejska Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to mental capabilities of the actor in respect to a particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between the actor’s behavior and the resulting damage). Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and the related subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Słowa kluczowe: Arystoteles, triada przyczyn, triada skutków, sprawiedliwość

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 68-92.

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Liczba ściągnięć:
343

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:Arystoteles, sprawiedliwość, triada przyczyn, triada skutków

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