Artykuły – Strona 29

Pojęcie dowodu jako otwarta rana prawa: niezmiennie błędna aporia?

Prof. dr José Manuel Aroso Linhares

Uniwersytet w Coimbrze

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: In the paper I would like to allude to the possibilities that at last seem recognisable (and can be explored) when, expressly refuting the scission postulate (either in its luminous positive version or in its deconstructive aporetic reproduction), an internally relevant thesis for methodological unity between evidentiary adjudication and adjudication tout court (between judicial reasoning with proof and adjudicative reasoning as the realisation of Law) is advocated – with the certainty that the defence of this claim does not deny (or dilute) the specificity of the evidence problem, but instead provides this specificity with new opportunities for being understood and experienced in direct connection with the (increasing!) need to identify law’s specific project and its autonomous practical world as an unmistakable cultural acquisition. To condense the argument, I would say that methodological unity has to do with the priority of controversy – as a specific practical structure demanding judgment and the constitutive entrance of the comparing Third – whereas the specificity of evidential judgment corresponds to the irradiance of the referential claim and the narrative intelligibility that identifies it.

Słowa kluczowe: prawo dowodowe, Piyel Haldar, sądowe rozumowanie dowodowe, orzeczenie jako realizacja prawa

Język artykułu: polski
Tłumaczenie: Bartosz Wojciechowski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 5-20.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 416

O trzech granicach władzy prawniczej

Dr Paweł Jabłoński, Dr Przemysław Kaczmarek

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: According to the initially assumed concept of limitations of lawyers’ power the most important elements of those limitations are: legal text, legal culture, and ethics. This structure is characterized by the relations where the anterior element defines the framework of the latter, i. e. text affects legal culture and ethics, while legal culture affects ethics. However, exceptions apply where the latter element might lead to the collapse of the framework of the primary factor (for instance, interpretation contra legem based on axiological argumentation). The aforementioned structure of limitations of legal power is complemented by interaction of various other elements, such as social expectations, political entanglement (depending on the extent to which it is not consumed by ethics) and non-judicial expertise.

Słowa kluczowe: granice władzy prawniczej, tekst prawny, kultura prawna, etyka

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 93-108.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 415

O sposobach pojmowania twórczego charakteru interpretacji

Dr Olgierd Bogucki

Uniwersytet Szczeciński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the notion of creative interpretation (of any text, especially creative interpretation of a legal text). The author points out that there are two different meanings of the expression “creative interpretation”. The first one can be called “ontological” and the second one – “methodological”. A given interpretation is ontologically creative when it creates a new object (which is a new meaning of some sort) and it is methodologically creative when it is established without applying any rules. Different theoretic approaches to legal interpretation presuppose different relations between ontological creativeness and methodological creativeness. The article explores some of them. The main thesis of the article is that when we say that a given interpretation is ontologically creative, we do not need to say it is methodologically creative (and vice versa).

Słowa kluczowe: interpretacja prawa, wykładnia prawa, interpretacja twórcza ontologicznie, interpretacja twórcza metodologicznie

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 21-33.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 425

O lukach w prawie rzadko spotykanych słów kilka

Dr Maciej Koszowski

Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu w Dąbrowie Górniczej

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The article addresses the issue of legal gaps (lacunas). Specifically, the author puts forward the general definition of legal gap which uses the concept of ‘automatically applicable’ legal rule as well as presupposes specific understanding of law – namely, that it is consisted solely of the rules of the mentioned type. Next, basing upon that definition, he defines three kinds of lacunas that are commonly distinguished in Polish and international scholarly literature, i.e. extra, intra and contra legem. As it is demonstrated, the merits of proffered definitions are manifold. First of all, they reduce the dependence of the notion of legal gap on value judgment. Secondly, they fairly well fit into the structure of contemporary legal orders. Thirdly, owing to them, the filling of legal gaps is not pointless. And lastly, the other kinds of lacunas one may encounter in academic literature are not at odds with the proffered theory, at least not by definition. At the end of the article, in the light of the main idea of the author’s conception, the Anglo -Saxon notion of the case of first impression is discussed, taking into account different models of (approaches to) the phenomenon of a binding judicial precedent.

Słowa kluczowe: luka w prawie, luka extra legem, luka intra legem, luka contra legem

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 109-122.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 1 447

Czy pojęcie prawa jest pojęciem z istoty spornym?

Dr Adam Dyrda

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Some legal thinkers (R. Dworkin amongst them) suppose that the concept of law is an essentially contested concept. This article firstly introduces the idea of essentially contested concepts, developed by W.B. Gallie. Secondly, it is argued that the concept of law cannot be perceived as an essentially contested concept, though some related concepts (such as “the rule of law”, according to J. Waldron’s analysis) can. Finally, I propose some arguments, in which I partly follow K. Ehrenberg’s recent analysis, showing that in Dworkinean terms, calling law an essentially contested concept may raise doubts and controversy.

Słowa kluczowe: spór, pojęcie, koncepcja, pojęcia z istoty sporne

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 54-67.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 397

Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część II

Dr Waldemar Gontarski

Europejska Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to mental capabilities of the actor in respect to a particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between the actor’s behavior and the resulting damage). Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and the related subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Słowa kluczowe: Arystoteles, triada przyczyn, triada skutków, sprawiedliwość

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 1(6)/2013, s. 68-92.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 365

Kulturowe uwarunkowania stosowania prawa karnego w Japonii

Prof. dr hab. Jacek Izydorczyk

Uniwersytet Łódzki

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The author describes the Japanese way of criminal justice in practice (law in action). But he shows the Japanese law in action as a ‘product’ of a quite different culture then the culture of Western World. First, presents in a glance history and religion of Japan. Next, shows development of new laws for Japan during XIX century when Japanese decided to ‘escape from Asia’ and join the Western World. Third part of the paper, explains the criminal justice system in contemporary Japan. The main part of the article focuses on Japanese criminal law as an everyday law in action (the law in action quite often very difficult to understand for Westerners). According to the author there are five main examples of those cultural grounds of Japanese criminal law in action. First – the Japanese way of preventing crimes; second – the Japanese idea what is (and what for actually is) criminal law; third – problem of so-called the opportunism principle which really dominates the criminal procedure in Japan; fourth – phenomenon of Boryokudan (Yakuza) in Japan; and last (fifth) – question what actually means the principle of fair trial (i.e. protection of defendants rights) in Japan in real life. The author’s conclusion is simple: law in action always depends from the culture of a country. That is why – when we talk on Japan – much more important is to understand such cultural grounds than just to know the legal system described by official ‘paper laws’.

Słowa kluczowe: japońskie prawo karne, wymiar sprawiedliwości, kultura prawna, prewencja

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(15)/2012, s. 77-91.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 384

In dubio contra reo? Sprawa Petera Fechtera

Dr Justyna Holocher

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The subject of the present paper is the evaluation of application of the rule in dubio pro reo in one of the so-called Border Guard Cases (Mauerschützenprozesse), known as the case of Peter Fechter. The question posed in the paper is, whether under circumstances of the lack of sufficient evidence, the application of the rule in dubio pro reo to some of the accused ones can result in assuming the rule in dubio contra reo (which is contradictory to the principles of criminal justice) against other accused in the same process. The main thesis of the paper is that the assumption of the rule in dubio contra reo is unacceptable on the ground of the principles of fair judicial proceeding. Such a rule violates principles of procedural and substantive justice and in consequence it also violates personal rights. In the analyzed case, under circumstances of the death of one of the accused border guards, the application of the rule damaged unlawfully the good name of the deceased.

Słowa kluczowe: Mur Berliński, sprawa Petera Fechtera, in dubio pro reo, in dubio contra reo

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(15)/2012, s. 67-76.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 326

Aitia – wina arystotelesowska. Zagadnienia definicyjne. Część I

Dr Waldemar Gontarski

Europejska Wyższa Szkoła Prawa i Administracji

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: When engaging in polemics with Pythagoras, Aristotle observed that the retributive function of punishment, as distinguished from the preventative one, does not involve revenge understood as material retaliation (i.e. suffering for suffering, meaning retaliation proportional to the damage suffered). It does not encompass a simple reciprocity, such as suffering in turn (ἀντιπάσχω), but instead shall be considered as a just reciprocity, meaning doing in return (ἀντιποιέω), whereby the degree of mental contribution is taken into account. The classical theory of responsibility, at least under the meaning assigned to it by Aristotle, considers human responsibility by means of reference to the mental capabilities of the actor in respect to the particular harmful action. An action involving human guilt is consequently contrasted with an accidentally caused action. In the works of Stagirite the mental attitude of the actor towards his action distinguishes human causation from the accidental one and from the forced one. Pythagoras, on the other hand, discussed material retaliation, meaning objective responsibility. At the same time, the author of Nicomachean Ethics had already experienced the system of subjective responsibility based on the concept of knowingly caused damage as opposed to the system of objective responsibility involving the objective causal relationship between actor’s behavior and the resulting damage. Aristotle has extended the concept of subjective responsibility to cover both knowingly caused damage (intentional fault) and unintentional fault, whereby the damage is directly caused by the negligent conduct of the actor, meaning the failure of the latter to observe required objective and abstract standards. The mental component and related to it subjectivization involve the actor possessing required intellectual capabilities, but not using them in a way as to observe the aforementioned imposed standards. Nonetheless, the potential mental component is itself not sufficient to establish guilt. Otherwise, all the people (apart from those lacking capacity at all) shall be declared guilty regardless of the fact that the damage was caused by them accidentally.

Słowa kluczowe: Arystoteles, triada przyczyn, triada skutków, sprawiedliwość

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(15)/2012, s. 51-66.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 381

Prawo spontanicznego porządku – Friedricha A. Hayeka koncepcja regulacji

Mikołaj Firlej

Uniwersytet Warszawski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: In the article three general questions were posed as a means of presenting explorative issue: (1) Law as regulation of an order; (2) Law as regulation of a liberty; (3) Controversy of social industry in law. In order to realize the issue thus outlined in the first section it has been shown two different and opposites kinds of orders in widely understanding term ‘sociology of law’ as well as Hayekian criticism of Descartes rationality. The structure of exogenous and endogenous orders has been carefully analysed in relation to their ancient equivalents: taxis and nomos. Special attention has been given to make an explanation of Hayekian understanding of legal frameworks connected with the process of organization and division of power. It has been outlined the rule of law in political system of Austrian economist (concept of demarchy) and his principal arguments for legislature and problem of ‘good regulation’. In the second part of thesis it has been shown a widely connection between spontaneous order and both liberty and the process of progression. In this section the strive was to present mostly values and good points in Hayekian conception, but there is also a critical part concerning both unsymmetrical constraint of freedom and symmetrical. In the third part of this thesis it has been shown the historical background of Hayekian research connected with the controversy of social industry in law. Referring to the intellectual dispute between Spencer’s organicism and Durkheim’s paternalistic conception Hayek has divided between law and law-making (legislation) and he has proved that law is only a spontaneous order notwithstanding good legislation means rules of harmonization and maintenance this kind of abstract social structure. Hayek’s concept of law is in accordance with philosophical, sociological, economical and political research of the general and popular nowadays problem with the new paternalism.

Słowa kluczowe: Friedrich A. Hayek, regulacja porządku, regulacja wolności, społeczna inżynieria

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(15)/2012, s. 36-50.

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Liczba ściągnięć: 351

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