Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej

Journal of the Polish Section of IVR (ISSN:2082-3304)

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Czy amerykańska jurysprudencja posiada reguły interpretacji Konstytucji?

Dr Anna Tomza

Uniwersytet Łódzki

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The most discussed issue in the theory of law is the problem of its interpretation, and main question in this topic is – how to make a proper interpretation? The American common-law, opposite the European theory of law, seems not to have general rules of interpretation, but only the idea of proper interpretation. Also the methodology of statutory interpretation is some kind of the judge-made law. As Henry M. Hart said „The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation”. According to this, currently the question focuses on finding the generally rules of interpretation, which should be some kind of canons of the statutory interpretation. This article tries to give the answer to the question: „if American jurisprudence has any rules of interpretation of law?”.

Słowa kluczowe: jurysprudencja amerykańska, wykładnia prawa, reguły interpretacyjne, konstytucja

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 125-133

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Liczba ściągnięć: 343

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:jurysprudencja amerykańska, konstytucja, reguły interpretacyjne, wykładnia prawa

Obiektywność w prawie – podejście instytucjonalne jako alternatywa dla dominujących stanowisk teoretycznych

Dr Maciej Pichlak

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The aim of the paper is to establish a theoretical elaboration of objectivity in law which would conform exiting linguistic practices in the legal field. It starts from a brief characterization of legal practice in this respect which allows for an exposure of semantic complexity of the term ‘objectivity’ in law. The term is said to take two basic meanings: objectivity as a fact and objectivity as a moral ideal. On this ground requirements towards a reliable theory of legal objectivity are defined: such a theory should not only make o room for both distinct meanings of legal objectivity, but also should consider their mutual relations. These requirements stemming from existing linguistic practice serve as criteria for examination of up to date theoretical concepts of objectivity. The paper discusses realistic, conventionalist, and idealistic theories of objectivity in law subsequently and exposes shortcomings of each of these. Eventually, key assumptions of an institutional theory of objectivity are presented which is claimed to offer a plausible understanding of objectivity in law in both its factual and ideal aspects.

Słowa kluczowe: obiektywność, teoria instytucjonalna, realizm, konwencjonalizm, idealizm

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 108-124

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Liczba ściągnięć: 21

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:idealizm, konwencjonalizm, obiektywność, realizm, teoria instytucjonalna

O odpowiedzialności karnej, uzasadnieniu kary i koncepcji komunikacyjnej karania

Dr Michał Peno

Uniwersytet Szczeciński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The article concerns the concept of punishment as an act of communication. Some retributivsts (i.e. ‘positive’ retributivists) believe that punishment communicates a censure. The article’s central proposition is that the act of communication is, in fact, strongly connected with the criminal responsibility. Furthermore, responsibility should not be identified with punishment. The so called positive retributivists claim that in order to fulfill communication purposes, offender have to be punished. However, punishment seems to be conceptually independent of the process of moral communication. It is shown that communication is linked with the very idea of criminal responsibility and the censure should by communicated through responsibility. Therefore, the article offers the view of responsibility as a complex process. Responsibility is an important social practice which in many cases can substitute punishment, particularly in its communicative aspect.

Słowa kluczowe: odpowiedzialność, uzasadnienie kary, komunikacyjna koncepcja karania

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 95-107

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Liczba ściągnięć: 326

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:komunikacyjna koncepcja karania, odpowiedzialność, uzasadnienie kary

Państwo prawa, filozofia publiczna i odpowiedzialność moralna naukowców

Prof. dr hab. Lech Morawski

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The paper discusses some relationships between the rule of law and the public philosophy. It is unquestionable that nowadays the scientism has become one of the dominant ideologies of industrial and post-industrial societies. Scientists and researchers take an active part in public life, are advisors to governments and corporations, comment in the media important public events. Thus, the problem arises of their moral and legal responsibility for what they say and do in public life. In my opinion, we may distinguish two different models of responsibility, which I call a model of scientist as an ordinary citizen and model of scientist always on duty. To put it another way, we may ask, whether the scientist in public life like an ordinary citizen can act in accordance with his political, economic or religious sympathies and preferences or just like a judge, priest or a physician is always „on duty” and always must follow all the rules of his profession. I defend the view that the adoption of the second model is one of the necessary preconditions of the existence of informed and rational public opinion and thus, the informed and rational rule of law.

Słowa kluczowe: państwo prawa, odpowiedzialność moralna, odpowiedzialność prawna, filozofia publiczna

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 85-94

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Liczba ściągnięć: 344

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:filozofia publiczna, odpowiedzialność moralna, odpowiedzialność prawna, państwo prawa

Idea bezpieczeństwa prawnego w polskim prawie spadkowym

Paweł Mącik

Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: The purpose of this paper is to present the issues of legal protection within inheritance law. A court decision made in the case of the ascertainment of inheritance, acquisition, or registered deed of succession, constitute the only proofs of legal succession, so their amendment or revocation is permissible only in the special cases indicated in the Act. Time and procedure limitations on amendments in respect of succession can potentially affect the accepted principle of justice. However, the State protects inheritance law and at the same time upholds legal protection. The fact that the legislator facilitated such a mode of procedure attests to the fact that legal stability and security of transactions are valued more than the protection of legal succession. However, this does not mean that the principle of justice and the protection of legal succession are not applied. Au contraire a person who is not a successor has the possibility to assert the protection of his/her rights at a particular time. On the other hand, the person who is a successor has to invoke the statutory presumption and has to have the sense of legal security guaranteed by the legislator which is required of him/her. As a consequence the conflict between the protection of legal succession and legal security arises. This presents the opportunity for reflection on the status of Polish inheritance law which will be provided in this article.

Słowa kluczowe: prawo spadkowe, bezpieczeństwo prawne, pewność prawa

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 66-84

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Liczba ściągnięć: 316

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:bezpieczeństwo prawne, pewność prawa, prawo spadkowe

Model precedensu z analogii

Dr Maciej Koszowski

Politechnika Śląska

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: Apart from the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions), or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, i.e. the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to generate just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience.

Słowa kluczowe: precedens sądowy, analogia, faktualny model analogii, model racjonalny analogii

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 43-65

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Liczba ściągnięć: 312

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:analogia, faktualny model analogii, model racjonalny analogii, precedens sądowy

Dowód z kultury (cultural evidence)

Mgr Anna Koropczuk

Uniwersytet Wrocławski

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: This article concisely presents the question of cultural evidence and the way it is conducted on the basis of judicial proceedings. It also highlights the distinction in the manner cultural evidence is considered on the basis of common and continental law. The author assumes that modern society is a multicultural society. It is a society in which role models and patterns of conduct are only created within the contact and conflict of different cultures. Solutions proposed in the article refer to the cases based on the cultural defense, where the culture is treated as a factor determining the actions of individuals. Cultural evidence has to be – in the authors’ opinion – a mean to demonstrate the clearance of the individual to take action subjected to the proceeding. Hence, the author outlines the procedure in case of the necessity of conducting such evidence.

Słowa kluczowe: dowód z kultury, obrona przez kulturę, postępowanie sądowe

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 35-42

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Liczba ściągnięć: 330

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:dowód z kultury, obrona przez kulturę, postępowanie sądowe

Pojęcie uczciwości w wykonywaniu zawodu adwokata

Mgr Tomasz Cyrol

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: How to understand fairness in the profession of advocate? It is obvious that the concept of fairness includes the lawful behavior. Lawful understood as comply with the „letter of law”. But the concept of fairness consists of other elements. Those are the compliance with the „spirit of law” and simply with the interests of client. The article describes different actions and influence exerting theories as examples of situations where conflicts between lawful actions and the interest of the client may appear. The conclusion of the article is that advocates have to work in a „fair” way. They are allowed to bend this rule under some circumstances but in those cases they are obliged to prove that they didn’t behave in an unlawful way and that their not fair behavior was in the interest of their clients. It is probably easier to behave in a fair way than to find justification for unfair such behavior.

Słowa kluczowe: uczciwość, zawód adwokata, litera prawa, duch prawa

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 26-34

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Liczba ściągnięć: 352

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:duch prawa, litera prawa, uczciwość, zawód adwokata

Prequel do Hartowskiego Postscriptum – brakujące ogniwo w debacie Harta z Dworkinem

Dr hab. Andrzej Grabowski

Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: In his translator’s note to the H.L.A Hart’s paper New Challenge to Legal Positivism, Andrzej Grabowski describes the historical details of Hart’s Madrid lecture and the changes of the original Spanish text, introduced in the translation. He argues that Hart’s paper can be regarded as the prequel to the ‘Postscript’ from 1994, since the lecture deals with the criticism of Dworkin against the Hartian version of legal positivism and some important parts of them (from Section II) were in extenso included in the ‘Postscript’. The translator also emphasises the importance of Hart’s lecture as a text-source of information, which can be used in the contemporary debate on the inclusive legal positivism and for the critical reconstruction of Hart’s theoretical position.

Słowa kluczowe: Herbert L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, pozytywizm prawniczy, debata Harta z Dworkinem

Język artykułu: polski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 21-25

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Liczba ściągnięć: 376

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:debata Harta z Dworkinem, Herbert L. A. Hart, pozytywizm prawniczy, Ronald Dworkin

Nowe wyzwanie dla pozytywizmu prawniczego

Prof. Herbert L.A. Hart

Uniwersytet Oksfordzki

Abstrakt w języku angielskim: In his lecture, delivered at the Department of the Philosophy of Law of the Autonomous University of Madrid on 29 October 1979, H.L.A. Hart directly responds to Ronald Dworkin’s attack on Legal Positivism, launched in Taking Rights Seriously. In the Sections I–II, Hart explicates his version of Legal Positivism by means of three central positivist theses: the Thesis of the Conceptual Separation of Law and Morals, the Thesis of the Social Sources of Law, and the Thesis of Judicial Discretion. Next, in Section III, he discusses Dworkin’s fundamental objections against the positivist theory of judicial discretion and claims that none of them seem convincing. Finally, in Sections IV–V, Hart analyses a new, herculean theory of adjudication, proposed by Dworkin as a „middle way theory” between the classic theories of Natural Law and Legal Positivism. In his answer to the criticism of the positivist Rule of Recognition, Hart claims that there is no reason why this rule, in certain jurisdictions, would not predict the use of the herculean procedure among the criteria that it provides for the identification of the law. He also states that the use of the herculean method of adjudication is unacceptable for the lawyers and that an impracticable character of this method is easy to demonstrate by referring to the case of the wicked legal systems, in which the principles underlying the law are morally bad. Thus, Hart concludes that instead of a sound vía media between Natural Law and Legal Positivism, the theory of Dworkin seems to offer the confusion of them.

Słowa kluczowe: pozytywizm prawniczy, „herkulesowska” metoda orzekania, trzy tezy pozytywistyczne

Język artykułu: polski
Tłumaczenie: Andrzej Grabowski

Opublikowano: Numer 2(9)/2014, s. 5-20

Ściągnij plik: Download


Liczba ściągnięć:
447

W kategorii:Artykuły Tagi:"herkulesowska" metoda orzekania, pozytywizm prawniczy, trzy tezy pozytywistyczne

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